




China's Rise: A Time for Choosing

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
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APPROVAL

The undersigned certify that this thesis meets master's-level standards of research, argumentation, and expression.

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DISCLAIMER

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author. They do not reflect the official position of the US Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force, or Air University.



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ABSTRACT

This study comprises an analysis of hegemonic stability theory in the context of US-Sino relations as China grows in power. It analyzes current literature applicable to accommodation (appeasement, stable peace, etc.) and historical examples and develops a theory of accommodation. An in-depth analysis of two historical case studies more fully elaborates the theory of accommodation for application to China and the United States. By analyzing the current climate and juxtaposing it against accommodation's requirements, the opportunities and obstacles are weighed. The conclusion is that accommodation is possible for the United States and China but will be very difficult. The path of least resistance and more popular path both internally and amongst allies would dictate a strategy of conflict, confrontation and containment possibly leading to greater conflict. This path strengthens the current regime and will not precipitate change as calculated. Yet the path to accommodation also entails risk; it must therefore be deliberately and consciously chosen. Once the course is set and benign intent confirmed, differences in the two polities will make the perpetuation of peace difficult and require conscious, continuous and methodical maintenance. The path is difficult but the alternative is superpower conflict escalating into spiraling security dilemmas and the possibility of world war.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

There exists a dynamic for change, driven chiefly by economic and technological developments, which then impact upon social structures, political systems, military power, and the position of individual states and empires . . . all of the major shifts in the world's military-power balances have followed alterations in the productive balances.

Paul Kennedy

According to Thomas Friedman, modern technology has “flattened the world” or leveled the playing field. No longer are American tax returns done solely by American accountants, nor are American patient laboratory tests examined by American doctors. Barriers of distance and information have fallen. Nations that once held technological superiority to maintain financial and security preeminence are beginning to find their advantage dwindled due to information and technological diffusion.¹ The Information Age is giving way to the Age of the Empowered Individual with global impact.

China, with its 1.3 billion empowered individuals, will soon economically eclipse the relatively population-scarce United States. The cyber world (coupled to advances in transportation) is enabling global power shifts with unparalleled velocity. The risk to American hegemony is enabled and accelerated by cybercrime, intellectual property theft, cyber espionage, and clandestine business operations. In 2008 the

¹ Thomas L. Friedman, *The World is Flat: a Brief History of the Twenty-First Century*, (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2005).

systemic loss of US economic value ranged as high as \$1 trillion.² As they enable foreign businesses and governments, the associated *relative* power shifts that accompany these losses could be multiplied many times.

For instance, cyber theft of F-22 and F-35 information from DOD contractors allowed China to showcase its newest stealth fighter aircraft for Secretary Gates ten years before US official forecasts believed it possible. In this instance, not only did America lose intellectual property worth more than \$45 billion, but China closed, almost overnight, a decade-long gap in technology and created capabilities of its own to help negate US military aviation advantages and somewhat level the playing field. Unable to keep a proprietary hold on information and technological know-how increases the risk to America's advantages. Further, America's increasing reliance on the cyber domain makes it more of an Achilles' heel to its advantages and its military forces.

America's plateau in power indicates it has reached an apex of strength from industrialization and the service sector. As other nations with greater populations and similar or better natural resources begin their journey of industrialization and empowerment through technology, the productive balances will shift. As productive balances shift, all other forms of power will shift commensurately.³ Owing to the flattening of the world, China is on a meteoric rise economically and is making up for decades of technological, economic and industrial backwardness. In fact, China is growing so rapidly that its leaders are literally capping growth at a modest 7% in order for internal and structural processes to

² White House. "Cyberspace Policy Review." Whitehouse.gov. 2008.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/Cyberspace_Policy_Review_final.pdf
(accessed January 16, 2012), 2. Joseph S. Nye, *The Future of Power*, (New York: PublicAffairs, 2011), 132.

³ Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000*, (New York, N.Y.: Random House, 1987), 439.

endure.⁴ Per capita income growth rate in the last decade has raged, with 2011 growth rates hitting a staggering 14%.⁵ All things remaining equal, China is set to eclipse US economic power and therefore challenge its hegemony. Its economic prowess will outpace US economic power, in terms of purchasing power parity, by 2016. While China may need many more years to catch the United States militarily, economics, the “advantages of backwardness” and demographics can slingshot China into the military lead relatively quickly.

US actions now require strategic thought, as today’s plans will determine the future. Available options include confrontation, domination or accommodation (or hybrids of these options). The George W. Bush presidency strove to dominate while cooperating economically. The Obama administration prefers to accommodate yet has increased confrontation. This paper will research whether accommodation is even possible, analyze the biggest obstacles and discover how accommodation can best be accomplished, if it is possible.

Hegemonic War

Change is a constant. Robert Gilpin,⁶ Paul Kennedy⁷ and many others who study international relations discovered that nations are unable to control economic and technological factors and therefore are unable to control change in the international system. Although economic power does not necessarily translate directly into military power, Kennedy showed that alterations in productive balances have preceded major shifts in the military balance of power.⁸ Whether these

⁴ Nanth Krishnan, "Slowing GDP growth in China Triggers a New Focus," The Hindu, on-line, Internet, 19 January 2012, available from <http://www.thehindu.com/business/article2811689.ece>

⁵ Krishnan.

⁶ Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics*, (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 28

⁷ Kennedy, 439.

⁸ Kennedy, 439.

changes are systemic as Goldstein or Modelski assert or whether they simply occur as nations maximize their power and privileges is of no consequence to this paper.⁹ What matters is that a nation's power is constantly changing relative to other nation states. These changes may or may not precipitate war, but more often than not have led to military conflict.

Historically, when a nation's relative power increases, it will seek to make changes to the international system to obtain the new prestige it perceives it deserves.¹⁰ Power is an evasive term and difficult to measure. Organski wrestles with this topic and states that national leaders must guess at their own power as well as other nations' power.¹¹ Miscalculations precipitate disaster. As one nation declines and another grows, the chances for conflict increase; it is in this stage where one nation's power is declining and the other's increasing that hegemonic power is normally challenged.¹²

When challengers have grown large enough to effectively challenge hegemons, war has often resulted, and has been damaging to both sides. Thucydides shows neither Athens nor Sparta claimed victory at the end of the Peloponnesian Wars, only Persia. Since the world has become sufficiently connected to be able to identify a *global* hegemon, Goldstein¹³ shows that in every case, neither the hegemon nor the challenger becomes the new hegemon. Liddel Hart's conclusion that "the most decisive victory is of no value if a nation be bled white while gaining it" resonates strongly for hegemon and challenger.¹⁴ Hegemonic wars are

⁹ Joshua S. Goldstein, *Long Cycles: Prosperity and War in the Modern Age*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988). George Modelski, *Long Cycles in World Politics*, (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1987).

¹⁰ Gilpin, 187.

¹¹ A.F.K. Organski, *World Politics*, (New York, N.Y.: Random House, 1969), 109.

¹² Gilpin, 187.

¹³ Goldstein, 285.

¹⁴ Frans P.B. Osinga, *Science, Strategy and War*, (New York, New York: Routledge, 2007), 34.

unlimited in means and scope and therefore devastating to all involved. Gilpin states that “all parties are drawn into the war and the stakes involved are high . . . the war tends to expand to encompass the entire international system; these are ‘world’ wars.”¹⁵

Some have ventured to conjecture that nuclear weapons have changed the course of history. They point toward the use of small surrogate or proxy wars since 1945 to prove their theory. However, sixty-seven years of history is statistically insignificant, given the history of man. Those who assume that the cost benefit analysis is too great for war, find themselves in the same utopian fantasy as Adam Smith, Norman Angell and much of the populace prior to World War I. Similarly, a vast majority believed this same fairy tale prior to World War II.¹⁶ The historical pattern of man indicates a precedent for war. Whether started through greed, miscalculation or megalomania, war is not dead. Future wars may remain conventional, become partially nuclear, apocalyptic or be avoided; the future of war is up to mankind.

Hegemonic stability theory spotlights many of the causes of world war and highlights a dangerous historical precedent unnervingly similar to a rising China and a relatively declining United States. E. H. Carr’s *Twenty Year’s Crisis* is apropos wherein he argues “readiness to fight to prevent change is just as unmoral as readiness to fight to enforce it. To establish methods of peaceful change is therefore the fundamental problem of international morality and of international politics.”¹⁷ Peaceful change is possible, but extremely difficult; this is why the historical pattern exists as it does. In order to explore how peaceful change is accomplished, this paper will analyze the current situation, assess the options and literature, devise a theory of accommodation, explore the most intransigent issues and finally make recommendations.

¹⁵ Gilpin, 200

¹⁶ Kennedy, 537.

¹⁷ E. H. Carr, *The Twenty Year's Crisis*, (New York, N.Y.: Palgrave, 2001), 202.

Power: US vs. China

Hegemonic war predicts that economic and power shifts between a rising China and a relatively declining United States will cause the next world war. As power is at the center of the question, we must first analyze the power of the two countries to determine if it is possible for China to reach parity or even exceed that of the United States.

Measuring power is highly subjective and very difficult to delineate perfectly. For simplicity, this paper will adopt Organski's and Goldstein's three measures of power—population, politics and economics to analyze this question, giving economics the bulk of the measure. Economics is considered the “godfather” of the indicator world because its measures incorporate many of the factors delivered by population, politics and military power. GDP statistically correlates strongly with many other factors of societal wellbeing and is used in measuring political affairs and policy. It is a powerful measure and encompasses an agglomeration of data that is standardized across the international arena, where other measures lack similar breadth and rigor. With that said, however, this paper will discuss all three sources of power and show that given current projections in these three measurements it is clear that US relative power is in decline to China's rising power.

Population. Stating that China dwarfs the United States in population is an understatement. China has over 1.3 billion people while the United States has nearly one billion less at approximately 310 million.¹⁸ China's human capital is unfathomable and is not only a huge asset but also a liability. China's command economy, by heavily investing in education, manufacturing and technology, is successfully managing its population and turning the power of population in its favor.

¹⁸ United Nations, "World Population Prospects, the 2010 Revision," United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, on-line, Internet, 21 December 2011, available from http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/unpp/panel_population.htm and <http://data.un.org/>

By utilizing the advantages of a command economy it maintains a labor-force participation at a very high level. This keeps idle hands busy while increasing the nation's overall production and international share of business and money.

With its entry into the World Trade Organization, China has introduced its enormous population resources to the world. This is driving prices for manufactured goods down worldwide and having global economic repercussions. Cheap semiskilled labor will work in China's benefit for the coming decade to increase its share of wealth and level the economic playing field globally.¹⁹ Outsourcing to China is growing enormously; even a cautious Japan, which normally does not play well with China, finds itself pulled into Chinese markets and having to limit its companies from outsourcing too much. For this reason, Barry Naughton, a leading specialist on the Chinese economy, surmises that "China has more to gain from globalization than any other economy in the world."²⁰ China's population acting on the world economy will bring it enormous dividends, more so because it is a dynamic, relatively well-educated and youthful labor force.²¹

The youthfulness of China's population allows for low dependency rates against a large and active labor population. The dependency ratio in China is one reason that China is having great success in its economics. Currently the dependency ratio is under 40%. This means that for every 10 workers only four people need to be supported. Compared to a world middle-income country average of 61.5%, this is an enormous boost to China's potential. China's declining dependency rates

¹⁹ Barry Naughton, *The Chinese Economy: Transition and Growth*, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2007), 398.

²⁰ Naughton, 399.

²¹ Naughton, 399.

gives them what Naughton calls a “demographic dividend” and provides a window of opportunity for China’s economy.²²




Figure 1: China vs. US Dependency Ratio

Source: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs. "World Population Prospects, the 2010 Revision."

China’s economic dependency will continue to decrease until around 2015. It will not rise above the 61% mark until around 2050. The United States on the other hand is currently at 49% dependency and increasing rapidly. It will rise above 61% around 2025. Figure 1 displays a comparison of dependency ratios between the two countries. According to Naughton, the difference in dependency rates as well as population extremes gives China tangible as well as intangible benefits. A younger population can adapt more easily to China’s ongoing transition and their increasing participation in higher learning and work favor China. Having lower dependency generally will lead to greater

²² Naughton, 172-3.

investment and savings which will increase the amount the nation has to invest. It also implies higher standards of living and a greater GDP per capita.²³

The population resource that China pulls from is enormous. This benefits China economically compared to the United States as it has a much larger pool from which to pull talent. As China continues to industrialize, and increase its ability to leverage technology, its population advantage is and will continue to provide huge economic benefits. Population, its demographics, education and structure are all powerful factors in GDP.

Economics. China lags behind the United States in GDP but is gaining quickly. As previously mentioned, GDP is the godfather of all metrics. Naughton shows that through industrialization alone a country normally attains a per capita income in purchasing power parity (PPP) of \$10,000 per year.²⁴ Currently China's per Capita GDP rests around \$7,600 per year. If Naughton's analysis is correct and China's GDP per capita in PPP increases to \$10,000 per year China's GDP becomes \$13.3 trillion. This nearly matches the US economy, strictly by industrialization of the Chinese economy alone. Of course, China will not stop there; efficiencies in industrialization are already moving many in China into the service industry. This is typical for modernizing economies and its entry into the services sector will continue to increase its GDP beyond that of the United States.

Where China will continue its impressive rise through industrialization, modernization and entry into the services sector, the United States has already arrived at its apex from these factors. Due to technological innovation and efficiencies it will continue to experience modest growth but nothing like the growth of developing countries such

²³ Naughton, 173.

²⁴ Naughton, 150.

as China. Even such sweeping technological changes, such as the Internet, only contributed 4.7% growth to US GDP annually.²⁵ The growth from technological change however is not limited to the United States, as technological diffusion increases its pace, these technological innovations will add similar growth to developing countries.

Where the United States used to hold technological advantage over most countries to maintain its relative lead, technological diffusion has rapidly increased, placing this leadership in jeopardy. With the onset of the Information Age, Thomas Friedman warns, in *The World is Flat*, that the United States cannot expect to maintain its lead in an information diffuse world. According to Colonel Geis, the US Air Force's lead of Blue Horizons, a long-range studies group that analyzes the effects of technology on security, the Information Age is leading to the age of the Empowered Individual.²⁶ This group's study concludes that more people are becoming educated through both the Internet and modern communication devices and are thus much more empowered. Proprietary information is becoming much more difficult to protect. China is not only utilizing data from the Internet but also stealing data from around the globe to aid in its technological modernization.

China is further accelerating this diffusion of information by enticing leading world competition to its shores. Western countries "offshoring" to China give China the advantages of Western technology, know-how and an economic dividend at the same time. It further allows them to spy, replicate and undermine western business practices. A report by the Georgia Institute of Technology in 2007 shows a continual

²⁵ McKinsey Global Institute, "Internet Matters: The Net's Sweeping Impact on Growth, Jobs and Prosperity," McKinsey&Company, 16, on-line, Internet, May 2011, available from http://www.mckinsey.com/Insights/MGI/Research/Technology_and_Innovation/Internet_matters/

²⁶ John Geis, *The Age of Surprise*, (Air University Center for Strategy and Technology, 2009).

“meteoric rise” of Chinese technological competitiveness as well as a decline in US competitiveness.²⁷ Leading specialists on China, at a recent Air Force Strategic Challenges conference, noted the actual realization of these predictions and stated that they have seen a “dramatic jump” in Chinese capabilities.²⁸ China has leveraged technology to depart from what Gilpin calls phase I of the growth curve of an economy to enter explosively into phase II. Phase I was marked by primitive production. In phase II, Gilpin explains, “growth takes place very rapidly because of the incorporation of new production techniques into the economy, usually imported from more advanced economies During this phase the rate of economic growth is affected by the choice of appropriate techniques, the rate of adoption of these techniques and the amount of savings or investment.”²⁹ By contrast, the United States seems to have reached the point of what Gilpin terms phase III in which the economy “has become mainly urban and industrial . . . and its growth takes place at a slow rate.”³⁰ The US relies heavily on its supremacy in technology, innovation and productivity to maintain its current economic growth. As China closes the technology gap, the US economy will stagnate due to increased competition in the same sectors; at the same time China’s economy will continue to increase spectacularly.

China has many other economic advantages. The Middle Kingdom is geographically positioned to take advantage of the United States, Japan, a rising India and all of Asia and Russia. China has a “strangle hold” on rare earth elements which gives them a strong advantage in

²⁷ Alan L. Porter, Nils C Newman, Xiao-Yin Jin, David M Johnson, and J. David Roessner, *High Tech Indicators: Technology-based Competitiveness of 33 Nations*, (Atlanta, GA: Technology Policy and Assessment Center, 2007).

²⁸ “The Asia Pacific Century--Emerging Strategic Challenges Conference,” (Maxwell AFB, AL, 2011)

²⁹ Gilpin, 160.

³⁰ Gilpin, 160-1.

high technology races in the coming years.³¹ China also understands the importance of education. The attainment of education in China has been increasing at “an astonishing rapid growth rate” per Naughton.³²

Naughton points out that a 10% dividend in GDP is expected for every additional year of schooling China adds to its population. Speaking to changes in China, Bill Gates stated “The Chinese have risk-taking down, hard work down, education and when you meet with Chinese politicians, they are all scientists and engineers.”³³ China, Naughton shows, is in a “high-speed phase of economic development”³⁴ coupled with declining dependency rates and increasing education rates. This confluence of events will drive GDP in China upward well into the next decade.

Experts are predicting this rapid growth to continue for at least ten to fifteen years.³⁵ Comparison of the data in figures 2 and 3 show China eclipsing the US economy in PPP by 2016 and in nominal GDP around 2040. Importantly, PPP GDP is good for comparing internal purchasing power while nominal GDP is important for defense and international expenditures. With that said, China benefits from what Robert Gilpin termed the “advantage of backwardness.”³⁶ Because China is an authoritarian regime, the Chinese government can control the per capita income and therefore the expectations and standard of living of the Chinese people. Further, China does not have the obligations of a global hegemon and so while its defense expenditures may be less than the United States they can be more narrowly focused.³⁷ By decreasing per capita income and siphoning greater amounts into government coffers, the Soviet Union was able to challenge the United States militarily on

³¹ The Asia Pacific Century.

³² Naughton, 196.

³³ T. L. Friedman, 379.

³⁴ Naughton, 173-4.

³⁵ The Asia Pacific Century.

³⁶ Gilpin, 178.

³⁷ The Asia Pacific Century.

less than half the nominal GDP at the height of the Cold War. China is well beyond that point now, with increasing momentum that cannot be stifled without enormous repercussions to the global economy. Given China's regime type and history, China has significant resources, even now, to begin challenging the United States in not only the economic sphere but the military and political spheres as well. Further, they are using those resources to invest heavily in China's future.




Figure 2: China vs. US GDP Based on PPP
Source: International Monetary Fund via Google Public Data




Figure 3: China vs. US Nominal GDP

Source: Frederick S. Pardee Center for International Futures via Google Public Data

Although GDP as reported by China is suspect because there are incentives for lying at multiple levels,³⁸ Organski points out that economic transactions in countries such as China are probably underestimated while GDP probably overestimates the power of developed nations.³⁹ Naughton says that although the world should approach China's data with caution, it does not change the fundamental picture of rapid growth.⁴⁰ So while the GDP data may not be exactly accurate, it is proving reliable and accurate enough to draw inferences in terms of order of magnitude and direction.⁴¹

One may conclude by looking at population and economic power comparisons that the United States' relative power is waning while China's is rising and may soon eclipse the United States. Looking at

³⁸ Naughton, 142.

³⁹ Organski, 214.

⁴⁰ Naughton, 142.

⁴¹ Naughton, 142

both economic and demographic data, even back in 1968, led Organski to declare, “the question is not whether China will become the most powerful nation on earth, but rather how long it will take her to achieve this status.”⁴²

Politics. US power versus China’s power in the field of politics finds the US in the lead and predictably so as long as China remains an authoritarian regime and the United States lives up to its democratic values. China tried for several years what Joshua Kurlantzick coined a “Charm Offensive.” Kurlantzick showed that China has recently tried to use soft power to transform the political power arena in China’s favor. In the end, Kurlantzick concludes that “China’s values appeal only to specific groups: elites in authoritarian nations, average people in [authoritarian states and] populaces in states willing to trade away some degree of political freedom for Chinese-style growth rates.”⁴³ He further urges the United States to live up to its values and suggests that it will find greater support than it has in the years following the unilateral decision to attack Iraq. However, he cautions that should the United States act outside its core values, as many believe it did in the 2003 war in Iraq, nations could continue to move toward China to balance US power.

Synthesis. Nations generally act in their own interests. Australia, a normally Western-facing nation, finds itself a torn power. It wants to continue its alliance with the West but increasingly finds its interests best served by closer ties to China. Similarly, Japan, a country at odds with China, is even finding the pull of a 1.3 billion strong market pool irresistible. Money translates into every other form of power; and as China’s GDP rises, it will gain political power as well. Similar to the rise of the United States after World War II, nations will eventually seek to

⁴² Organski, 486.

⁴³ Joshua Kurlantzick, *Charm Offensive: How China's Soft Power is Transforming the World*, (New Haven and London: Yale University, 2007), 229.

bandwagon with China out of economic interests and all other forms of power will follow from these relationships.⁴⁴

A decelerating US economy occurring as baby boomers begin their retirement could cause further changes in the US economy. The debate between guns and butter will necessarily favor butter in the coming decades and consumption will most likely win over investment and protection. If the United States has to suppress consumption, social tension and class conflict most likely will weaken the US social fabric as well as its power.⁴⁵ This most likely will occur during the same time China is challenging the United States, further exacerbating and accelerating the decline.

Similarly, China's vast population has a liability function. China's rapid rise and empowerment of individuals with higher education and standards of living have forced the Chinese leadership into a corner where they must continue growing economically at a rapid pace.⁴⁶ Economic deceleration is no longer an option for the authoritarian regime. Corruption combined with a high degree of nonperforming loans could threaten economic expansion for the short-term, breeding animosity towards the regime. For this reason, increased focus on loyalty of the PLA to the regime and a greater emphasis on nationalism frame the regime's high anxiety about its populace and place as China makes the transition from an agrarian economy to an industrial superpower.⁴⁷ In fact, many of the current US strategies seem centered on a hope and almost religious belief of an impending collapse of the

⁴⁴ A note of caution must be met in all these forecasts. Projections are based on trends, historical data and educated guesses. Important incidents such as Tiananmen Square and September 11, 2001 can make vast changes to any and all of this. It must be remarked that notoriously poor calculations of the future predicted Japan eclipsing US power back in the 1980s only to fizzle in the 1990s. How the future turns out can only be conjecture at this point.

⁴⁵ Gilpin, 167.

⁴⁶ Susan L. Shirk, *China: Fragile Superpower*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).

⁴⁷ The Asia Pacific Century.

Chinese regime. Yet the CPC has successfully navigated the opening up of China to the world and as long as China continues to increase its prosperity, which is very likely, their chance of implosion is small. Those hoping for an overnight democratization, in the likeness of overnight change in the former Soviet Union, fail to understand the cultural, historical and vastly different circumstances facing China and the Soviet Union. Further, the lesson of Russia's overnight changes and its destructive power was not lost on the Chinese people who understand they must not repeat the same mistake in their country.

It is not this paper's intention to prove that Chinese power will exceed US power in the coming century; just that it may be a strong possibility if Chinese leadership can successfully navigate domestic issues. How the United States approaches China's potential rise in the next decade, however, is of critical importance and the central focus of this paper. If China continues to rise and the United States navigates this rise unsuccessfully it could, and according to others will, lead to another World War. Susan Shirk, the former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State responsible for US relations with China asserts, "rising powers cause war not necessarily because they are innately belligerent, but because the reigning powers mishandle those who challenge the status quo in one way or another."⁴⁸ Gilpin goes so far as to assert that just the perceived certainty of gain most frequently causes nations to go to war.⁴⁹ Further, authors such as Gilpin, Kennedy and Goldstein all believe that nuclear weapons do not change the historic potentiality of war between rival hegemonies. Gilpin asserts that a "disequilibrium between the structure of the international system and the redistribution of power has been war, more particularly, what we shall call a hegemonic war."⁵⁰ It is in this environment of perceived certainty of China's gain to which this

⁴⁸ Shirk, 261.

⁴⁹ Gilpin, 92.

⁵⁰ Gilpin, 197.

paper now turns and seeks an answer on how to not mishandle China's rise. Nuclear war is unthinkable but the threat is very real. What are the options?

Options

Hegemonic stability theory suggests that, given the foregoing discussion, the world is headed for a transition. Carr's plea for peaceful transition is echoed throughout literature, art and poetry.⁵¹ While Gilpin regrettably states that "peaceful change has little chance of success" he leaves a glimmer of hope that "choices always exist."⁵² Similarly, Organski states, "As a challenger grows more powerful, it begins to demand new arrangements and changes in the international order that will give it a larger share of the benefits it desires. In theory, those who dominate the existing international order could make way for the newcomer and welcome it into the top ranks, giving up some of their privileges in the process. In practice, however, such action is rare. Desiring change and unable to bring it about peacefully, the challenger all too often turns to war."⁵³ However, Organski leaves a glimmer of hope for humanity by stating that the way a nation uses its power is a choice.⁵⁴ Several alternatives exist when a mature hegemon finds itself in the unfortunate predicament of losing international power against a rising challenger. None are really satisfactory or palatable and this is why status quo nations tend to remain rigid, set in their ways until war forces the change. This is not the only option but is the one that is most likely. Staving off the rising power is another option, as is accommodation—both will be discussed later.

⁵¹ Carr, 202.

⁵² Gilpin, 209 and 228.

⁵³ Organski, 371.

⁵⁴ Organski, 173.

Increase Resources

The first and most desirable option is to increase and/or rejuvenate the existing hegemon's own resources. The current international construct and democratic values makes traditional territorial and resource expansion options untenable.⁵⁵ The United States would lose political power and lose more power than it could ever gain in trying to expand its current territorial resources. Taxing the current populace heavily could increase US power temporarily but this is only a short-term fix. The only real feasible long-term option in this realm is to increase immigration and heavily incentivize the growth of family. This option may prolong China's rise but to do it effectively and in a sustainable manner, it will probably be too little too late.⁵⁶ The US is left to rejuvenate its economy which it is desperately struggling to do, but with a one-to-one debt to income ratio, little is left for investment. Similar to Great Britain in the early 1900s, the United States, due to economic, political, social and ideological reasons, will probably not be able to pursue any of the rejuvenation options with great effect.⁵⁷

Gilpin states that there is little a state can do once it reaches the point of diminishing returns, besides expand. He says that "within the existing social and political framework" growth will falter at some point unless populations grow or technology makes advancements that change the limits imposed by natural resources; the law of diminishing returns means that growth will reach a peak and then begin to falter.⁵⁸ This is the struggle in a phase III economic situation where the United States depends on new innovations for growth. The confidence that technology continues to grow exponentially and that the United States could maintain its hegemony through technological supremacy is only a

⁵⁵ Organski, 347.

⁵⁶ Organski, 351.

⁵⁷ Gilpin, 195-6.

⁵⁸ Gilpin, 80.

strategy of hope and one that diffusion through information will make far less likely. Information is leveling the playing field for nations in this regard.⁵⁹

Confront

A second option is to stop China's rise or slow it. During the Peloponnesian War, Sparta attempted to confront Athens while it still had the power to stop its rise. As mentioned earlier, however, this method worked out poorly for both Athens and Sparta and has historically worked out poorly for both the challenger and the hegemon.⁶⁰ Slowing China's rise is an option to the United States, where current and past policies have actually precipitated its rise. However, stymieing industrial growth and keeping competitors down overtly, or even covertly, is not a popular internal or external policy and even more difficult to enact against a closed nation such as China.⁶¹ Further, Japan and the Soviet Union are good examples of countries' abilities to industrialize despite significant obstacles and lack of help from the outside.⁶² Although this option can prolong the status quo longer than inaction, given China's current clout and technological knowledge this would now be a measure too late, only slowing their growth and possibly doing as much (or more) harm domestically and internationally as good. This strategy would also alienate a near peer power raising the specter of greater conflict.

Further complicating this strategy is the fact that this strategy prolongs the critical period of near parity between the two countries.

⁵⁹ T. L. Friedman.

⁶⁰ Wars between the existing hegemon and the challenger have given rise to a third power in every instance except Britain which was able to maintain hegemony after its hegemonic war with France. Wars between Portugal and Spain gave rise to the Netherlands. Wars between the Netherlands and France gave rise to Great Britain. Wars between Great Britain and Germany gave rise to the United States.

⁶¹ Organski, 347-8.

⁶² Organski, 348.

Organski shows that the risk of hegemonic war is greatest during the periods where there is approximate parity in power as it is harder to gauge supremacy at this point.⁶³ Therefore, it is better, if peace is the aim and China continues its relative rise to the United States, to have China's rise proceed faster rather than slower. A slow-rising China leaves doubt at the most volatile time when the two powers are approximately equal and both nations have the greatest propensity to miscalculate their relative power. It is better, therefore, for both nations, and the world, if actions of this sort do not occur.

Fostering a change of regime in China might seem a good course but this could easily backfire and create a war or world economic instability over which statesmen could soon lose control. Jervis, Posen and Kapuchan show that unfettered power generally triggers balancing in the international system and undermines the rules of international society.⁶⁴ Gilpin suggests another way to confront a rising power is through alliance. This appears to be George W. Bush's strategy and part of the current US military strategy. Gilpin points out several problems with alliance: first, the United States will overpay in the long run without a commensurate commitment from its allies; second, the allies it chooses may "turn and rend" the United States as China rises; third, allies may pull the United States into the conflict it seeks to avoid or into lesser conflicts with heavy costs giving rise to imperial overreach.⁶⁵

Confrontation helps China's government remain in power and fosters increased nationalism while decreasing US prestige and legitimacy as the world's leader. In the end, if China continues its relative rise and is constantly rebuffed because the United States chooses the path of confrontation, its most likely outcome is conflict and

⁶³ Organski, 372.

⁶⁴ Charles A. Kupchan, "Enmity into Amity: How Peace Breaks Out," *International Policy Analysis*, 2011, 394.

⁶⁵ Gilpin, 193.

war that leaves the two countries at best embittered enemies. This could go three ways; the two countries go to war drawing the world into war, a strategic arms race ensues or China reacts peacefully until it is too powerful and then becomes an enemy of those that opposed its rise.⁶⁶

A policy of confrontation evokes an emotional response and reduces the possibilities for a responsible response as China may find it difficult to control the emotions of 1.3 billion people.⁶⁷ The most likely response to confrontation is another Cold War style arms race. Confrontation policies in the region are responsible for Japan, South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, India, the Philippines, Vietnam, Thailand, Singapore, Taiwan, Bangladesh and Australia increasing their expenditure on weapons. As armed forces increase, so does the potential for armed clashes, miscalculation, misunderstanding and misinformation.⁶⁸

Accommodation

The third option is accommodation. Gilpin and Rock both note that since the pacification of Hitler and World War II, “appeasement” (which lies at the beginnings of accommodation) is a dirty word in international relations with negative connotations. Gilpin says this is unfortunate “because there are historical examples in which appeasement has succeeded. Contending states have not only avoided conflict but also achieved a relationship satisfactory to both.”⁶⁹ Organski describes the option of accommodation saying that a nation can help

⁶⁶ This would be the realization of Deng Xiaoping’s doctrine of *Tao guang yan hui* or biding the country’s time to get revenge.

⁶⁷ Shirk, 269.

⁶⁸ Shirley A. Kan, *U.S.-China Military Contacts: Issues for Congress*, (Congressional, Congressional Research Service, 2012), 3. Eric Talmadge, "Battle for Control of Asia's Seas Goes Under Water," *BostonGlobe*, on-line, Internet, 19 January 2012, available from

http://www.boston.com/news/education/higher/articles/2012/01/19/battle_for_control_of_asias_seas_goes_underwater/?page=full

⁶⁹ Gilpin, 195.

another nation rise “in the hope that in gratitude it will remain friendly, even after it has become powerful enough to do as it pleases.”⁷⁰ Gilpin suggests that states must accommodate in a way that does not lead to continuing deterioration in a state’s prestige and position.⁷¹ While Russia did not “accommodate” the rise of the United States per se, its retrenchment shows the results of swift withdrawal and perception of changing power balances when the retrenchment portion of accommodation is accomplished too rapidly. The resulting disasters in international prestige and position and in its vital interests make Russia’s experience a lesson to manage the pace of accommodation.

Organski notes that the accommodation option is difficult, if not impossible, for most nations to take. It means consciously abdicating the lead position and understanding that a more powerful nation will thereafter constrain its freedom of action and interests.⁷² Further, nations fear appeasement as it may appear to be strategic weakness and may only create a climate of increasing concessions and loss of power as seen in the Russia example.⁷³ Rock points out, in *Appeasement in International Politics*, that there are no historical instances where a stronger nation has accommodated the rise of another nation strictly for the sake of peace.⁷⁴ Gilpin and Organski both note that only strategic strain has led countries to seek retrenchment, appeasement or accommodation.⁷⁵ Gilpin (in concert) with Carr declares:

Although men desire peace, it is not their highest value. If it were, peace and peaceful change could easily be achieved; a people need only refuse to defend itself. Throughout history, however, societies have placed other values and interests above their desire for peace. From this perspective the basic

⁷⁰ Organski, 349.

⁷¹ Gilpin, 194.

⁷² Organski, 349.

⁷³ Gilpin, 207.

⁷⁴ Stephen R. Rock, *Appeasement in International Politics*, (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 2000).

⁷⁵ Gilpin. Organski.

task of peaceful change is not merely to secure peace; it is to foster change and achieve a peace that secures one's basic values. Determining how this goal is to be achieved in specific historical circumstances is the ultimate task of wise and prudent statesmanship.⁷⁶

Gilpin, Bull and Carr all share similar misgivings that states must share common values and cultures in order to make accommodation even feasible.⁷⁷ While this gives China the opportunity for a responsible response there is the risk of an unwanted response in the opposite direction.

Current US Policy

As stated earlier, all of these decisions are fraught with risk and none are palatable. The United States has consciously chosen schizophrenia in relation to China's rise. It has chosen a hybrid between confrontation and engagement. This is a hedging policy that will not achieve positive outcomes. Empowering China through engagement, the United States now fears the very nation it fostered and seeks to contain it even whilst increasing its engagement. By engaging China, the United States hoped and hopes for a *strong, prosperous* and *responsible* China. Meanwhile, its policy of containment whilst engaging it, is giving the United States only a *strong* and *prosperous* China.⁷⁸ This duplicitous and self-defeating policy is coined "congagement;"⁷⁹ a policy of engaging China in hopes that it will become a "responsible" power but containment in case it does not.

President Clinton believed that engagement would help bring China into the international society and bring about greater responsibility. Consequently, he normalized trade and pushed for China

⁷⁶ Gilpin, 209.

⁷⁷ Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), 304-5. Gilpin, 209. Carr, 202.

⁷⁸ The Asia Pacific Century.

⁷⁹ The Asia Pacific Century.

to enter the World Trade Organization. Uncertain of China's intent and needing to assure allies, however, he also strengthened the US alliance with Japan. President G.W. Bush similarly deepened economic ties with China and alliance with Japan but also forged a new alliance with India while increasing relations with Singapore and Vietnam.⁸⁰ Despite rhetoric to the contrary, the Obama administration has not only sought deeper engagement with China but as China increases its military prowess, President Obama has felt strong international and internal pressure to contain China's rise. US military positions overseas have formed a pattern, which China correctly perceives as military encirclement. As the United States and its allies recognize incompatible values coming out of China, the encirclement will likely continue to increase.

The hope of the United States is that "convergence" will shape the choices Beijing makes but China's leaders know that the only choices acceptable to the Washington consensus are democracy and perhaps subservience to Washington's leadership.⁸¹ China fears democratization both for the regime and for the country. The political elite do not want to relinquish power and both the people and elites are fearful of change that is so rapid it repeats the demise and dissolution of the Soviet Union.⁸² Significantly, China's reaction to US encirclement has precipitated a far greater partnership between Russia and China. Further, a security spiral has emerged as China seeks to protect its vital interests and emerging needs and the United States seeks ways to defeat China's increasingly sophisticated weapons.

⁸⁰ Goldman, 158.

⁸¹ The Asia Pacific Century.

⁸² Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, *Electing to Fight: Why Emerging Democracies Go To War*, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005). These authors show that young democracies are more likely to fight wars, which may only put the world in a greater predicament if they did successfully democratize in such a relative power position to the United States.

Predictably, the path of “conengagement” is a strategy for defeat. Engagement is fueling the engine of prosperity. Confrontation is providing pretext for China to steal \$1 trillion/year in intellectual property. Engagement will only increase China’s power. Containment on the other hand will make China feel distrustful of the community of nations, making it less desirable to maintain the established international order or fulfill perceived responsibilities within it. Containment will further foster nationalism within China, only strengthening the regimes grip on the country and making it more desirous for change in the international system. Engagement will eventually provide the fuel to give it the power to make the changes in the international system it seeks. Engagement is allowing China to become strong and prosperous, but as the rest of the world is too afraid of China to allow it any responsibility, it cannot develop or learn nor display this requirement for acceptance into the community of nations.

Unfortunately, historical records of rising powers predict that China will not remain sufficiently patient to continually take rebuffing and inability to make changes to the international system as it rises in power. Gilpin, Kennedy and Organski all show that challengers are most likely to strike before they have sufficient power to force the current hegemon to acquiesce peacefully. All else being equal then, it is predictable that the United States and its allies will seek a policy of confrontation. However, because the United States will probably be unable to generate sufficient additional resources to meet the emerging threat it will increasingly be unable to maintain its global responsibilities. As nations begin to sense a shift in power, costs and commitments of US hegemony will further increase, accelerating US relative decline.⁸³ Further, because of China’s significant economic

⁸³ Gilpin, 191.

power, nations may begin to ally with China as the cost/benefit analyses begin to favor it.

“Congagement” then is a recipe for eventual confrontation and disaster for the United States. As previously discussed, a policy of confrontation is fraught with peril. Historically it is the predicted path and so far, the United States is gradually moving in this direction. As all realists understand, if confrontation is to be the policy, then the United States needs to make its move before China’s military capabilities near parity with those of the United States. This choice is unfeasible for moral and practical reasons and the United States must wait until this decision is forced upon it, ruining the country, its power and resources.⁸⁴ Rarely does the choice between war and peace favor peace, yet a peaceful transition is possible that allows the United States to maintain a leadership role in the world and will also lead to greater prosperity for its individuals.

⁸⁴ Organski, 348.

Chapter 2

Assessing a Peaceful Transition

American decline is relative and not absolute. Given its size and resources, it ought to possess approximately 16 to 18 percent of the world's wealth where it once held 40 percent.¹ The world is witnessing the “right sizing” of America's power relative to its resources which, ironically, it will likely reach the same year as China equals it in GDP in PPP around 2016. In a right-sized world, the United States remains a very significant world power; however, due to other countries' resources, it will not maintain world leadership. The only thing that can jeopardize the United States' substantial place and important role in this new world is a failure to adjust to these realities and accept its place.² In order to do this, the United States needs to adopt a different perspective and replace the desire to maximize relative gains with a desire to maximize mutual gain to maintain one of the lead positions in the world.³

As outright confrontation is unfeasible and China's growth is inevitable, America must change its response to maintain a lead position in the changing world. Accommodation is one way to accomplish this. Accommodation as defined here is to make room for, to meet the needs of and adapt or fit in oneself to. It is a place where both countries can achieve a mutually satisfactory relationship.⁴ Unlike Rock's definition of appeasement but similar to his definition of rapprochement (one of his zones of stable peace), accommodation does not only seek to reduce tensions by removing the causes of disagreement but also seeks a

¹ A.F.K. Organski, *World Politics*, (New York, N.Y.: Random House, 1969), 533.

² Organski, 533.

³ Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics*, (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 223)

⁴ Gilpin, 193-4.

homeostasis of mutual satisfaction. It does not, however, go as far as Kupchan's definition. Kupchan defines accommodation as "the creation of a deep and durable peace, one in which the absence of war stems not from deterrence, neutrality or apathy but from a level of interstate comity that effectively eliminates the prospect of armed conflict. When a zone of stable peace forms, its member states let down their guard, demilitarize their relations, and take for granted that any disputes that might emerge among them would be resolved through peaceful means."⁵ While that definition is close, this paper's definition does not incorporate the requirement to create a "zone of stable peace" but only stability sufficient that neither side feels its security or vital interests are threatened.

Accommodation as defined here is closer to Kupchan's definition of rapprochement, which he defines as a state of peaceful coexistence that is regularized and practiced rather than institutionalized and co-binding.⁶ This reduces the requirement and level of comity to a lower level that allows for significant differences of opinion. It allows for these opinions and actions without resulting in the use of, signaling or threat of force. Therefore, accommodation encompasses the lower levels of coexistence at the lower levels and includes everything along the spectrum to the higher security communities and unions as well. In setting forth this definition, it is important to consider that the peace may have an element of instability and thus may not be "deep."

Literature

There are surprisingly few books and studies on peace. Recently however, a few authors have rejuvenated an interest in peace and now offer a foundation for building a theory of accommodation. Stephen Rock writes about four cases where peace "broke out" and showed that it

⁵ Charles A. Kupchan, *How Enemies Become Friends*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010).

⁶ Kupchan, *How Enemies*, 68.

mattered less how much power a nation has rather what the state does with its power.⁷ Rock tried to show that a stable peace requires high heterogeneity in interests and economic activity and high homogeneity in societal attributes. He then extrapolates these studies and analyzes their implications for peace between the United States and the former Soviet Union. The resulting expectation is that a stable peace is unlikely due to low heterogeneity in vital interests and low homogeneity in societal attributes. He still leaves hope suggesting that individuals can change things with time and suggests that if the two states work on peace and diversify their interests that peace may be possible despite low cultural homogeneity.

Craig and George showed there are five stages required to get hostile states to reach a stable peace: détente, rapprochement, entente, appeasement and/or alliance.⁸ At each successive stage greater desire for improved relations moves each state to remove causes of animosity until they are being removed methodically and full appeasement is reached and/or the states enter alliance. Craig and George showed that individuals matter greatly in producing these changes.⁹

Several authors have studied security communities to decipher what makes a security community and how it persists or decays. In *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area*, Deutsch defined a security community as “one in which there is real assurance that the members of that community will not fight each other physically.”¹⁰ Bounding his studies to the North Atlantic communities and similar to Rock, Deutsch emphasized how interaction and then homogeneity in

⁷ Stephen R. Rock, *Why Peace Breaks Out: Great Power Rapprochement in Historical Perspective*, (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1989).

⁸ Gordon Alexander Craig and Alexander L. George, *Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of Our Time*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990) 249.

⁹ Craig and George, 257.

¹⁰ Karl Wolfgang Deutsch, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience*. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957), 5.

culture and society lead to mutual sympathy, a “we feeling” and mutual identification in self-image.¹¹ Not surprisingly he found that compatible values facilitated the security community and responsive institutions and governance. He also found that a common threat was important to begin the process.

Kenneth Boulding’s lectures in *Stable Peace* track with Deutsch’s definition of stable peace and declare it as “a situation in which the probability of war . . . [is] so low that it [is] virtually not to be taken into account in the international relationship.”¹² Boulding suggested that mutual concessions can “produce a dynamic of adjusting national images until the images become compatible.”¹³ Unlike Deutsch, he believed communication and integration can begin these processes.

Adler and Barnett, in *Security Communities*, showed how positive and dynamic transactions, organizations and social learning as well as knowledge and power undergird “the development of trust and collective identity formation.”¹⁴ They used three, phases, nascent, ascendant and mature, to show how institutions form and the norms that come from these institutions will form norms of multilateralism that deepen the relationship further. Using socialism as a framework, Bruce Cronin in *Community Under Anarchy*, showed that social identities can form the type and nature of the security system between states. He argued that identities shape preferences and that states must go beyond realist or liberal ideation and form common identities which can then produce deeper security communities. Without these, the peace is much less stable.¹⁵

¹¹ Deutsch, 36, 129.

¹² Kenneth Ewart Boulding, *Stable Peace*, (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1978) 45.

¹³ Boulding, 113.

¹⁴ Emanuel Adler and Michael N. Barnett, *Security Communities*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 17.

¹⁵ Bruce Cronin, *Community Under Anarchy: Transnational Identity and the Evolution of Cooperation*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 13-4.

In another constructivist argument, Arie Kacowicz and Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov, in *Stable Peace Among Nations* argued that nations must undergo “strategic” or “complex” learning in which “each party learns that it is dependent upon the other to assure its security.” After this change in perception, nation states redefine their national interests, redefine the new status quo and are careful not to pursue goals that are likely to bring the two down paths that may lead to war.¹⁶ They argued that four conditions are necessary for the beginning of peace: stable political regimes, mutual satisfaction with the terms of the peace agreement and/or the existing status quo, predictability of behavior and problem-solving mechanisms and open communication channels including initial (mutual) trust and respect between the leaders.¹⁷

Further, they noted that two additional conditions are favorable to stable peace: third-party guarantees and perceptions of elites that peaceful relations are beneficial.¹⁸ In order for this initial change to move toward a stable peace it must be internalized by the institutional entities of the state in order to “create and perpetuate a definitive change in the ‘cognitive maps’ of the actors involved.”¹⁹ Kacowicz and his co-author argued that peace is stable when “the two parties agree to avoid war or threats of war in their mutual relationship and to use only peaceful diplomatic means to resolve any potential conflict between them.”²⁰

Rock, in *Appeasement in International Politics*, specifically looked at the appeasement portion of peace and how and why the appeasement portion of peaceful relations either succeeds or fails. The lessons learned from his 14 propositions are that appeasement will not work if both

¹⁶ Arie M. Kacowicz, Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov, Ole Elgstrom, and Magnus Jerneck. *Stable Peace Among Nations*, (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc, 2000), 24-6.

¹⁷ Kacowicz, et al., 25.

¹⁸ Kacowicz, et al., 26.

¹⁹ Kacowicz, et al., 33.

²⁰ Kacowicz, et al., 23.

states' vital interests overlap. Appeasement will work if each state develops a shared relationship of strategic change and mutual understanding.²¹ He postulated that appeasement works best if a powerful nation appeases a non-powerful nation first to show sincerity.²²

In his book, *How Enemies Become Friends: The Sources of Stable Peace*, Charles Kupchan argued that stable peace happens in phases. The four phases leading to stable peace are: unilateral accommodation, reciprocal restraint, societal integration and narrative generation.²³ He argued that nation states must have institutional restraint and a degree of cultural commonality to achieve unilateral accommodation and reciprocal restraint. Moving to the next phase of societal integration requires compatible social orders, while narrative generation and the finalizing of stable peace requires cultural commonality.²⁴ The final phase of stable peace may take on three depths of stability: rapprochement, security community and union.²⁵ Kupchan, however, failed to show that societal integration and narrative generation are required for rapprochement and almost seem antithetical to his definition thereof.²⁶

All authors indicated that peace is possible between two dissimilar nations but the depth of that peace depends on similarities over which

²¹ Stephen R. Rock, *Appeasement in International Politics*, (Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky, 2000), 169-173.

²² Rock, *Appeasement*, 167.

²³ Kupchan, *How Enemies*, 37.

²⁴ Kupchan, *How Enemies*, 54.

²⁵ Kupchan, *How Enemies*, 37.

²⁶ Kupchan, *How Enemies*, 68. Kupchan says rapprochement "is more about practice than institutions" in which "the parties reach a state of peaceful coexistence, but cooperation take the form of self-binding rather than a co-binding and is regularized but not institutionalized...rapprochement is . . . first and foremost an effort to redress strategic deficiencies; the prospect of building stable peace materializes only as reconciliation proceeds. In this sense, rapprochement is the consequence of tentative efforts to use diplomacy to neutralize a threat, which, when successful, then open up the possibility of a more profound change in relations...it emerges incrementally as geopolitical rivalry wanes" not as the end result of his phases. Therefore I would place the beginnings of rapprochement somewhere between his phases of reciprocal restraint and societal integration. Kupchan, *How Enemies*, 68.

statesman have little immediate control, but may have influence on over the long term. This paper will draw on these sources to discover how nations can reach the point of bilateral accommodation that is mutually agreeable while opening the door for greater depth and stability of peace. Accommodation seeks for a minimal mutually agreeable place where nations exercise self-restraint and create a normative relationship and societal norms of peaceful resolution of differences.

While the study of friendship is laudable, not every state can become deep friends, allies and members of the same union. Sometimes there are incompatibilities that prevent deep friendship. However, even dissimilar nations can reach a level of accommodation and mutual respect sufficient for peace. The world annually spends about \$2.2 trillion on war and security.²⁷ The only meaningful security is common security, particularly where military engagement could rapidly and inadvertently escalate to nuclear, mutual and/or world annihilation.²⁸ In this environment, accommodation may be the only peaceful means and minimum standard of relations to prevent nuclear cold or hot war and the wasting of national funds on endless security spirals or global suicide. Accommodation theory, then, provides a means to avoid hegemonic war in favor of global common security without donning utopian lenses of world peace and friendship.

Fortunately, history has borne witness to a few occurrences of accommodation to inform the literature above. The nuclear security environment today makes the study of accommodation that much more important, particularly as nations begin to approach parity in power with the United States. If left to the casual accumulation of tactical,

²⁷ Global Security, "World Wide Military Expenditures," Global Security, on-line, Internet, 27 December 2011, available from <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/spending.htm>

²⁸ Joshua S. Goldstein, *Long Cycles: Prosperity and War in the Modern Age*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988), 376.

operational, short-term, and limited decisions and outcomes, the historic precedent suggests the historic human cycles of hegemonic war continue but now with a nuclear twist.²⁹ A strategy, consciously avoiding historic cycles of hegemonic war, is the path to avoid it. Therefore these few but precious gems from history may be instructive for future prospects of accommodation.

Examining these gems, it becomes evident that almost every case required intense internal or external pressure to forge lasting accommodation and sufficient impetus to begin the process. There is only one case where these pressures did not exist and ideological impetus fostered accommodation; this is the case of the Sino-Soviet alliance. This historic example displays the instability of mutual accommodation based on ideological terms where pressures do not create necessity. As the 9/11 Commission Report pronounces, “Insight for the future is thus not easy to apply in practice. It is hardest to mount a major effort while a problem still seems minor. Once the danger has fully materialized, evident to all, mobilizing action is easier—but it then may be too late.”³⁰ There are no cases where accommodation has occurred strictly out of rational human thought and intervention in the international arena. This point has serious implications, discussed later, for the United States and China scenario under analysis.

Instances of Accommodation

Great Britain and the United States

The classic and perhaps model case of accommodation, and the only case of peaceful transfer of global hegemony, is the case of Great Britain to the United States from 1895 to 5 March 1946 where Churchill

²⁹ Harry Yarger, *Strategy and the National Security Professional: Strategic Thinking and Strategy Formulation in the 21st Century*, (Westport, Conn: Praeger, 2008), 41.

³⁰ Thomas H. Kean, et al. “The 9/11 Commission Report,” 350, on-line, Internet, n.d., available from <http://www.911commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf>

abdicates hegemony to the United States in his “Sinews of Peace” speech at Westminster College.

Great Britain in the latter part of the 1800s began to feel the strain from imperial overreach and the rise of several great powers. It was a mature power and so the costs from private and public consumption were increasing while the costs of protection were increasing as well.³¹ Britain tried to increase its wealth by consolidating its empire and drawing on all its resources. This worked to some degree but it did not have sufficient appeal to those at home or abroad to fully succeed.³² Attempts to rejuvenate the economy were attempted but the requirements to do so were incompatible with the social, political and ideological climate at the time.³³ Finally Britain embarked on a course of retrenchment from its overseas commitments to focus on its continental issues, particularly Germany’s attempts to become a strong naval power.

Britain began a period of consolidation to meet the near-simultaneous threats of France, Germany, the United States, Japan, the Boers in Africa and Russia. France and Russia challenged Britain’s preeminence in the Mediterranean. Germany and Japan began expanding their navies which presented a direct challenge Britain’s power at home and abroad. Further, the United States began challenging its power on the American continent with the Monroe Doctrine. In its consolidation, Britain allied with Japan, sought rapprochement with the United States and France and focused its balancing against Germany and Germany’s new imperial ambition. It was not the intent of Britain to pass world leadership to America but to consolidate its power for fights closer to home. After nearly a century of rivalry, relations began to thaw as a result of imperial overreach on the

³¹ Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics*, (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 195.

³² Gilpin, 195.

³³ Gilpin, 196.

part of Great Britain and its commitments substantially outweighing its resources. Britain began accommodating the United States by appeasing the United States on the issue of Venezuela and acknowledging the Monroe Doctrine as international policy. America reciprocated by agreeing to Britain's requests regarding the Venezuela jurisdictions of courts of justice and not contesting border resolutions that landed in Britain's favor. The United States, in short, did not take advantage of London and the two nations began a relationship of mutual reciprocation. As Britain was the preponderant power, it conceded more than the United States in the relationship but as the relationship grew, Britain began to feel the mutual benefits of allowing America to rule the Americas and began to understand that the Americans had no intent in infringing on their vital interests. Owing to American policy and restraint, Britain saw this rising behemoth as benign and remained focused on Europe, Africa and Asia giving the United States more and more concessions to consolidate its power. Britain, in the end, fought a war of hegemony with Germany only to finally abdicate to the vast resources of the United States.

Accommodation began with the intent to reduce the burdens of hegemony and avoid conflict in the Western Hemisphere. A significant act of appeasement was offered and the kindness was reciprocated. A normative relationship of peaceful resolution began via arbitration where interests overlapped. Kupchan concluded that the "effort to regularize mutual accommodation set the stage for the successive acts of reciprocal restraint that would lay the groundwork for lasting rapprochement"³⁴ and finally a "special relationship" that has lasted nearly a century.

This case will be more fully covered in chapter 4 but it is worth mentioning here that many facilitators assisted the efforts of both countries. Neither side had vital interests at stake; both countries had

³⁴ Kupchan, *How Enemies*, 79.

cultural, linguistic, racial and ancestral affinities.³⁵ Further, they were ideologically compatible and had a common social and political order.³⁶ In short, once appeasement began and a mutual understanding of benign intent became obvious, rapprochement began and from there it was an easy transition to a greater feeling of “we-ness” and a strong and durable security community that remains to this day.

Great Britain and Japan

A similar pattern emerged in the Anglo-Japanese alliance in 1900. Again, Britain faced a multitude of threats to its power and sought to reduce the number of its commitments. In this instance a mutual enemy, a combined Russia and France, drove the two powers together. Japan helped Britain in the Boxer Rebellion and Britain helped Japan in its war against Russia in 1904. A spirit of reciprocal accommodation led the two powers to even deeper cooperation and trust.³⁷ For extending the alliance to India, London recognized Japan’s right to occupy Korea. In World War I the cooperation increased and accommodation deepened further. Britain and American friendship outpaced Britain’s accommodation and alliance with Japan. Japan was looking for continued affirmation of great power status as an ally in World War I, however, instead of increased friendship it increasingly found Britain cozying up to one of its chief security concerns, the United States. This feeling only deepened when it was left in an ancillary role in the signing of the Washington Naval Treaty causing the comity and trust between the two powers to sour. Japan became suspicious of Great Britain and Great Britain and the United States became suspicious of Japan. Finally

³⁵ Stephen R. Rock, *Why Peace Breaks Out: Great Power Rapprochement in Historical Perspective*, (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1989).

³⁶ Rock, *Why Peace*.

³⁷ Kupchan, *How Enemies*, 137.

Japan's invasion of Manchuria marked the formal end of a mutual accommodation and courtesy that lasted nearly two decades.³⁸

Argentina and Brazil

Argentina and Brazil's antagonistic relationship dates back to the colonial era and the Argentine-Brazilian War over Uruguay. War almost broke out in 1870 over disputes in the Paraguay region. An antagonistic relationship existed between the two countries, punctuated by unresolved territorial disputes, and marked by muted hostilities throughout the nineteenth and most of the twentieth century. Yet in the late 1970s the two countries broke this unfriendly relationship in favor of mutual accommodation and comity.

Argentina sought accommodation with Brazil mostly due to external pressures. A dispute with Chile soured relations with the United States and Britain at the same time Brazil's growing economic prowess increased the tension between the two countries. This pressed Argentina to seek reconciliation. Domestic pressures, for the more powerful Brazil, encouraged a reciprocal response. Brazil's opening (abertura) to greater civil liberties could only be kept alive as long as hardliners were kept out of power and the only way to keep them out of power was to keep external tensions with Argentina at bay.³⁹ Internal threats for Brazil and external threats for Argentina, then, prompted mutual acts of appeasement and accommodation.

Argentina made the first overt and explicit move by approving Brazil's plan for greater electricity by building a dam on the Parana River—something that had been a source of tension for years.⁴⁰ Brazil's president reciprocated by visiting and furthering Brazil's external openness. Both sides demonstrated benign intent and cooperation

³⁸ Kupchan, *How Enemies*, 138.

³⁹ Kupchan, *How Enemies*, 122-5.

⁴⁰ Kupchan, *How Enemies*, 125.

deepened. The steps were slow due to Brazil's hardliners but both nations slowly and steadily improved relations to the point that they jointly founded Mercosur in the 1990s.⁴¹ What may have turned into a nuclear arms race had fizzled due to mutual accommodation and comity. Factors such as common cultures, religion, social and eventually political orders all facilitated the process of accommodation and is taking the two nation's relationship from mutual appeasement to mutual self-identity and we-ness.⁴²

Other Instances

There are other gems of mutual accommodation in history. England and France worked out mutual accommodation after years of conflict in the early 1900s and Norway and Sweden's conflicts reformed in 1905-1935 which transformed them to a continued and lasting mutual accommodation and friendship. These have all undergone similar patterns as above. The Sino-Soviet relationship in the mid-1900s is no exception; however, a lack of external pressure or internal pressure forcing accommodation allowed the relationship a level of greater freedom. While there were external pressures on China and Russia that contributed to their relationship, Kupchan shows that it was ideological reasons that brought them into this relationship more than these other pressures.⁴³ As further proof of this, while these pressures remained, as soon as leaders began to diverge ideologically, the mutual spirit of comity and accommodation fell sharply and kinship quickly dwindled into troops massed on each other's borders.

From these examples and the academic literature on the subject, several patterns appear from which can be built a theory of accommodation. Nations can build a relationship around a shared sense

⁴¹ Kupchan, *How Enemies*, 134.

⁴² Kupchan, *How Enemies*, 134.

⁴³ Kupchan, *How Enemies*, 158.

of comity and congeniality; a sustainable attitude where the use, the threatened use or signaling of the use of arms is no longer a consideration. Accommodation gets countries in a position to maintain peaceful resolution and a reciprocal relationship from which deeper security communities and friendliness can be further fostered if desired and if not, simply continued to maintain mutual and beneficial peace.



Chapter 3

Accommodation Theory

As demonstrated from the examples in the last chapter, accommodation is a place of homeostasis between two countries where both countries achieve, at a minimum, a mutually satisfactory relationship of peaceful coexistence that is regularized and practiced. Again, this relationship may not be deep and stable; however, it is marked by a norm of peaceful resolution purposefully and severely limiting military actions and options to keep security from being perceived as threatening. Several requirements seem necessary for accommodation to occur between nations: Nations must have inducements or proper incentives to seek changes, they must be able to enter a reciprocal relationship that does not threaten their security interests, there must be easy and clear communication and finally there must be mutually acceptable and binding mechanisms for dispute resolution. Other factors are facilitators that move the process along much more quickly or further than if those factors did not exist. The more facilitators that exist, the deeper the peaceful cooperation can go.

Requirements

Inducements

Significant incentives and motivations must exist, particularly for the stronger state, in order for détente and acts of appeasement to begin and continue. In the case of the United States and Britain, Britain had strong strategic imperatives for large concessions to the United States while the United States likewise had strong internal and external

strategic incentives to accept these concessions and reciprocate and develop a stronger relationship.¹ In the case of the Sino-Soviet accommodation, the inducements were largely ideological for the stronger Soviet state. While there were ideological inducements for China, they were also motivated by security concerns.

Appeasement received its deplorable reputation from the world's experience at Munich. The two lessons learned from trying to appease Hitler were that a hostile state cannot be appeased and (given in the timeless words of Pericles) "if you give way, you will instantly have to meet some greater demand."² With this perception in mind, Gilpin states that the problem with the policy of appeasement is finding a way to do it without signaling a deterioration of a state's prestige or position.³ Robert Jervis showed both sides of this issue nicely, stating that:

Our memories of Hitler have tended to obscure the fact that most statesmen are unwilling to pay an exorbitant price for a chance at expansion. More moderate leaders are apt to become defenders of the status quo when they receive significant concessions. Of course the value of these concessions to the status quo power may be high enough to justify resistance and even war, but the demands are not always the tip of an iceberg. To use the more common metaphor, the appetite does not always grow with the eating. It partly depends on how one gains the meal and what suits one's taste. Concessions that are wrenched from the state by dire threats are more apt to lead to an image of it as weak than are concessions that appear to be freely given. And concessions on issues that are understood to be important to the side receiving them but not to the side making them are especially likely to be self-limiting.⁴

¹ Stephen R. Rock, *Appeasement in International Politics*, (Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky, 2000), 163.

² Robert B. Strassler and Victor Davis Hanson, *The Landmark Thucydides*, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2008), 81.

³ Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics*, (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 194.

⁴ Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 90.

Rock takes up this theme in *Appeasement in International Politics* and proves that appeasement did have negative effects in the case of Germany prior to World War II. However, he debunks the myth that appeasement should be a disreputable strategy for states and proves that it can be highly effective with moderate leaders. Speaking on appeasement, Rock states that effective appeasement means giving up something of great value and that states often choose threats rather than inducements because the perception is that threats cost less and do not mean sacrifice of anything up front.⁵ These sacrifices are what make accommodation theory so difficult to instigate and are the primary obstacle for statesmen to begin the appeasement and accommodation process.

Therefore, there is a requirement for inducements because they create an environment where sacrifice will receive sufficient support for initiation, reciprocation and sustainment. Statesmen may be able to slowly affect conditions over time, but many times they cannot manipulate them or do so quickly enough to have any strategic effect. The economic, ideological and cultural environment often constrains diplomatic intentions.

Understanding the environment of one's own state is crucial to knowing whether or not accommodation is even feasible or acceptable to begin the process in the first place. Knowing the environment of the target state is crucial in knowing whether or not reciprocation is feasible and acceptable in its context as well. There must be an environment in both states that allows for a relationship to begin, develop and be nurtured.

⁵ Rock, *Appeasement*, 7.

Reciprocation

Using the case of Hitler, it is easy to see the importance of reciprocity in the process. Accommodation is a poor policy if sufficient inducements do not exist or if states do not intend to give the necessary concessions for a harmonious and sustained relationship. The process of reciprocation fosters and shapes a normative state of comity. If there are insufficient inducements to overcome intractable homogenous interests or if interests cannot become sufficiently heterogeneous through compromise and reciprocation then accommodation is likely not possible.

Appeasements may work for short-term goals but accommodation requires a long-term commitment to reciprocity, eventually touching all areas of disagreement that may affect the long-term relationship and a desire and ability to significantly shift policies in favor of cooperation rather than discord. States must thoroughly analyze overlapping strategic interests to determine the extent to which interests can be adjusted in favor of cooperation.

For example, Hitler's ambitions reached much further than the concessions either France or Britain were prepared to grant. A more thorough analysis would have shown both Britain and France that Hitler's ambitions reached much further east and that appeasement in this instance was not the solution they thought it was. In the words of Roosevelt, building peace requires "workable minimums" not "impossible maximums."⁶ Hitler wanted impossible maximums while the French and English were only willing to give workable minimums.

For these reasons, understanding leadership intent and knowing national intent is crucial before beginning this process. Where intent cannot be known for sure, open communication and tests may prove

⁶ Charles A. Kupchan, *How Enemies Become Friends*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 398.

necessary to divine intent. In the case of Hitler, a short read of *Mein Kampf* would likely have enlightened Allied leaders and after Czechoslovakia, Hitler's intent would have been very clear. In the case of the United States and Britain, a display of benign intent, reciprocation and strategic restraint signaled to both countries that they could deepen their relationship without threatening their security.

However, it is the greater power that must be prepared to give greater concessions as it likely has more to concede and the weaker power will need greater assurances for its security concerns. This creates a dynamic where the more powerful state will have to make greater unilateral concessions to display its benign intent.⁷ Demanding reciprocity undermines accommodation, particularly where significant security concerns exist.⁸ Yet, this can be difficult for a stronger power to do, unless significant inducements exist either exogenously or internally.

Communication and Clarity

Communication and clarity of intent are important requirements for accommodation. In international relations significant resources are dedicated to understanding a state's intentions. Behavioral signals, domestic characteristics and politics and all forms of communication are analyzed when trying to divine intent. When all of these signals show an environment of cooperation and complementary interests the other nation can infer a state with benign intent.

In order to move into a normative relationship of comity, both nations must be able to communicate and maintain clarity of intention to continue the relationship. Rock asserts that the greater the clarity of intent the more likely appeasement and accommodation will succeed.⁹ Governments by necessity proceed cautiously in a state of international

⁷ Rock, *Appeasement*, 164.

⁸ Rock, *Appeasement*, 164.

⁹ Rock, *Appeasement*, 162.

anarchy, particularly in relation to states where governmental leadership is highly transitory and constantly fluctuating. Kupchan asserts that if states could move forward with greater confidence in their assessment of benign intent, the greater the transformative potential of that relationship will be.¹⁰ Therefore the greater the amount of communication and clarity and spirit of cooperation between states, the more likely accommodation is to succeed.

Mechanisms for Dispute Resolution

The final requirement for accommodation is state commitment to peaceful resolutions over future points of conflict. The mechanism may simply be a normative state of resolving issues diplomatically and through a reciprocating desire to keep the peace. It could be international dispute arbitration or multilateral agreements. It does not matter what the mechanism for dispute resolution is, only that it is mutually agreeable, is just and transparent as possible and is mutually self-binding. The International Criminal Court is one such mechanism available to states that submit themselves to arbitration, but this does not have to be the only mechanism. In the case of Great Britain and the United States, the two nations submitted any differences to arbitration. Later, when the relationship warmed, the two nations resolved conflicts through low-level diplomats under the auspices of working out a mutually agreeable solution peacefully.

Facilitators

Dispute resolution mechanisms and how deep a relationship becomes depend greatly on the existence of facilitators. Some researchers studying stable peace believe facilitators are requirements and find them determinate, while others believe they were important in historical cases but not required. A survey of the cases and the

¹⁰ Kupchan, *How Enemies*, 28.

literature leads to the premise that facilitators can move accommodation to higher territories of cooperation and engagement but are not necessary to reach a minimum normative and multilateral stasis of peaceful resolution and comity.

Again, as in the case between Argentina and Venezuela and the United States and Britain, once the process of accommodation began, these facilitators gave the process greater momentum and longevity. While these facilitators were not present in the case of Japan and Great Britain, the choice became much more conscious and deliberate, required more work and attention and were therefore less stable, but still possible. In the instances where many facilitators existed, such as the United States and Great Britain, once a solid commitment to accommodation amalgamated, peace prospered from a momentum that took on a life of its own.

Facilitators are diverse and many. Many of these are cited in the case of the United States and Great Britain's accommodation: common language, culture, social order, political order, political structure, race and ancestral heritage. Other facilitators include heterogeneity in economic and political interests and homogeneity in culture. Compatible values, third party guarantees and buy in from economic, societal and political elites have all been known to aid the process.

Like many of these facilitators a common threat may be an inducement or a facilitator, depending on the nature of the threat and its probability and intensity. In the case of the Sino-Soviet accommodation ideology was the primary inducement for the accommodation rather than just a facilitator. In the case of Brazil and Argentina common religion facilitated greater feelings of support to the process. In general, anything that can produce cooperation and foster a sense of trust, we-ness, respect and mutual regard for one another can facilitate the process along.

Historical records on interaction and mutual integration are mixed. Interaction and integration may help or hinder the process, depending on the atmosphere. For instance, liberals point to economic interaction as a bastion of peace and a harbinger of integration (as they are in a climate of accommodation or friendship). In contrast, however, in an atmosphere of competition, realists assert that more touch points between two societies creates greater friction. Both views are correct within differing contextual atmospheres. Interestingly, Kupchan mentions one facilitator of the Concert of Europe that is often overlooked—the ability to ignore and not interfere in areas of disagreement. In this instance the great powers agreed not to interfere in each other's domestic affairs because of the incongruity of their political systems.¹¹ It is left, therefore, to the wise politician to use, ignore or thwart these facilitators based on the context.

Context Matters

The largest and most difficult task for statesmen seeking to apply accommodation theory is to understand the context within which they are trying to apply it. The environment must be ripe or at least ripe enough to couple accommodation to a nation's foreign policy relations. First, a word about internal affairs and then a discussion on exogenous factors is necessary.

The British government, realizing that it was in dire straits, prepared its citizens for concessions to the United States. Britain feared domestic backlash and so had to hide some of these concessions.¹² In other instances, Britain cast the narrative before the opposition and painted it in such a light as to obscure the negative connotations.¹³

¹¹ Kupchan, *How Enemies*, 61.

¹² Kupchan, *How Enemies*, 93.

¹³ Kupchan, *How Enemies*, 93.

Britain established an Anglo-American Committee to foster greater public support, particularly by leading opinion makers,¹⁴ and the ruling party continually focused on the benefits of accommodation and avoided conversations about anything negative. In the United States, the ruling party was able to give concessions by focusing on its successes elsewhere and operating from a position of strength. The British helped foster the internal environment to ensure that “politics of accommodation prevailed over the politics of humiliation.”¹⁵ Elites further facilitated this in both nations’ internal discourses helping arouse popular support.

Discourse and the media laid the foundation, in this instance, to garner sufficient internal support to allow accommodation to take hold and propagate. Carr, in *The Twenty Year’s Crisis* suggests that statesmen must sometimes create the environment to make it appear that the only choice is the choice statesmen want the nation to take.¹⁶ The point here is that internal politics matters in foreign affairs and for successful accommodation, internal politics should not interfere or be a hindrance to the level of trust required for mutual reciprocation. Indeed, it was bellicose and caustic narratives from internal factions that brought the Soviet and Chinese accommodation so abruptly to an end in the 1960s.

Similarly, exogenous factors matter in accommodation. States cannot control external affairs and therefore states tend to be over determined toward the use of deterrence, threats and force which they can govern. Force is easier to control than peaceful means which requires reciprocation, patience and hard work. Therefore the choice for accommodation is the harder choice and requires the will of the other state.


¹⁴ Charles A. Kupchan, "Enmity into Amity: How Peace Breaks Out," *International Policy Analysis*, 2011, 5.

¹⁵ Kupchan, *How Enemies*, 106.

¹⁶ E. H. Carr, *The Twenty Year's Crisis*, (New York, N.Y.: Palgrave, 2001), 196.

Enticements may facilitate this and the creation of a national imperative toward accommodation utilizing international politics may assist the other country to foment internal support. However, many times this may be outside of a statesman's control. Further, a target nation must not be too greedy, too revisionist, or too war hungry and must have a sufficiently stable regime to participate in mutual accommodation.

In sum, accommodation requires inducements, reciprocation, mechanisms of communication that are clear and transparent as well as mechanisms for dispute resolution. Facilitators must be handled on a case-by-case basis, depending on the atmosphere in which they are applied. Finally, accommodation requires the will of both states to coalesce and to demonstrate externally and domestically the willingness to foster sufficient trust for accommodation to succeed.



Chapter 4

Case Studies

The historical instances of accommodation in Chapter 2 all contain the requirements for accommodation and many facilitators. Using the construct set forward in chapter 3, analysis of two case studies in depth will add greater clarity to the theory of accommodation. The most important case study and one where the hegemon allowed the peaceful rise of another more powerful hegemon is instructive and apropos. For this reason, analyzing the case of Great Britain and the United States is important.

The other case selected is the case of Great Britain and Japan due to its similarities between the China and United States scenario discussed above. It represents democratic and authoritarian systems reaching accommodation and examines issues of social and cultural heterogeneity. It also shows that accommodation is possible, but, due to a lack of facilitators, requires much more deliberate maintenance.

Great Britain and the United States

Prior to Great Britain's accommodation of the rise of the United States, a relationship of great animosity existed between the two. After war in 1776 and the War of 1812 the US relationship with Great Britain was tainted by boundary disputes, arguments over fishing rights and other resource disputes. In the Civil War the British backed the Confederacy. Charles Sumner would later claim British assistance prolonged that war by two years. Disputes in the 1880s and 1890s

became so contentious that “talk of war was not uncommon.”¹ Britain denied the Monroe Doctrine, sought to prevent the United States from constructing a canal through the isthmus of Central America and resisted the United States at every turn.

Inducements

The strategic calculus began to change however toward the end of the 1800s. The United States economy began to outpace the British economy in the 1850s and around 1900 America surpassed Britain in Gross National Product.² In 1890 America’s navy had no battleships, but by 1905, due to Theodore Roosevelt’s “Big Stick Diplomacy,” the United States took over as the world’s second largest Navy.

In 1907 Roosevelt paraded the “Great White Fleet” globally to showcase American power. At the same time, Britain found itself embroiled in conflicts in Afghanistan and Southwest Asia and preparing for potential disputes in China. Germany began its naval expansion using British technology and France and Russia challenged Britain in the Mediterranean. In short, Britain’s resources were stretched beyond their capabilities due to challenges to its power all over the globe. In addition a boundary dispute between Venezuela and Great Britain broke out in which the validity of the Monroe Doctrine came into question.

Beset by the Boer war, serious threats to its home and imperial security and increasing responsibilities around the globe, Great Britain felt compelled to choose its battles with the powers closer to home than with the United States. It was eager to benefit from eliminating America as a rival and looked to expand American trade. Ceding the western hemisphere to the Americans would also allow them to concentrate needed forces elsewhere. Further, Britain believed that American

¹ Stephen R. Rock, *Why Peace Breaks Out: Great Power Rapprochement in Historical Perspective*, (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1989), 24.

² Rock, *Why Peace*, 30.

ambitions were very limited, certainly did not involve any British vital interests, and it could afford to give up disputes over the boundaries of Alaska and the canal issue. Finally, America wanted acknowledgement as one of the great powers, something that Britain was willing to concede. Because there was much to gain, little to lose and the American continent so far away, the British decided to accommodate the United States.

Inducements for the United States were less powerful but still existent. The United States received the benefits of British power. The Americans decided it was better to accept concessions from Britain to strengthen itself than to take appeasement as a sign of weakness. It sought Britain as a new-found ally as well. Growing suspicion over Germany led the United States to see Great Britain as a powerful ally, willing to give the United States a strategic advantage to check growing German power on the continent and its ambitions in the Caribbean and South America. It also sought greater economic gains from exports and it understood the financial politics of British investors holding 75 percent of all American securities.³

Reciprocation

In light of these circumstances, the British accommodated the United States with an act of unilateral appeasement. In order to make sure the intent of the appeasement was clearly understood, Great Britain not only agreed to America's terms about the Venezuela issue, but further stated their acceptance of the Monroe Doctrine, effectively ceding the Western Hemisphere to the United States. This not only gave the United States the acceptance it sought as a great power but it conceded the issue with Venezuela and essentially every other dispute to America in the Western Hemisphere. Great Britain thus explicitly and clearly

³ Stephen R. Rock, *Appeasement in International Politics*, (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 2000), 46.

articulated to the American public its benign intent. The signal was all the more clear as it was given from a position of power.

The United States immediately responded in kind to this generous offer. It did not act or indicate that Britain had acted out of weakness; instead, it understood British overtures and did not press its demands or take advantage of Britain, an act that would have turned British sentiment directly against it. America backed off its strict demands in the Venezuela crisis and even allowed the crisis to end in Britain's favor, after submitting it to arbitration without dispute. America then allowed a dispute over seal hunting to come under arbitration between the United States and Great Britain, setting a precedent for the future. Compared to the British act of appeasement, these seemingly minor reciprocations may seem insignificant, but they signaled to Great Britain that the United States was willing to reciprocate in kind and not take advantage.

From here the two began a process of international reciprocation that led to the special relationship that exists today. The British backed America against Spain while the Americans backed the British in the Boer Wars. Even when disputes over territory or the isthmus became problematic, the two sides submitted the issues to arbitration, the mechanism for dispute resolution, while maintaining in word and attitude a convivial spirit.

Communication and Clarity

It has just been mentioned the importance of the clarity of the appeasement and accommodation that Great Britain offered to the United States. Not only was the appeasement so large and concession so encompassing that the act was clearly a signal but communication through other mediums further facilitated accommodation. Discussions in Parliament made clear the benign intent of the United Kingdom. Back

channels to Theodore Roosevelt and to the public assured the US president and public of Britain's true intentions.⁴

Kupchan shows that reconciliation between the two sides was primarily an elite phenomenon; once the elites came on board, the rest followed.⁵ Politicians, diplomats and military officials started the change in tone and the media joined in the chorus on both sides of the Atlantic to eventually develop a feeling of comity. Grasping many of the facilitators discussed later, both sides began to move from neighbors to friends to brothers and resoundingly declare that war was impossible between them.

Acts and rhetoric followed one another closely. In fact, after the Spanish conflict and the positive relations from acting in each other's interests, the rhetoric had grown to such an extent that many believed that the United States and Britain had signed a secret alliance. Both Britain and America, through acts and corresponding words, ably convinced their domestic populations to cast a blind eye to over a century of conflict. In just a few short years, America went from Anglophobe to England's staunch friend.

Mechanisms for Dispute Resolution

Great Britain and the United States had utilized arbitration in several past disputes but it never had become a standard. Not only did Britain agree to allow the Americans to submit the Venezuelan dispute to arbitration, it also decided to use the American mechanism of resolution for all future disputes. They codified the Olney-Pauncefote Arbitration Treaty which was signed by US Secretary of State Olney and Sir Pauncefote, the British ambassador to the United States. Although it did not pass the Senate (by only three votes), it set an important precedent

⁴ Charles A. Kupchan, *How Enemies Become Friends*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 77.

⁵ Kupchan, *How Enemies*, 85.

for the future of US-British relations. It most importantly was used during the contentious debates over resources and set a precedent for the use of peaceful rather than military measures to solve future disputes. Eventually, in 1907 both signed a convention for the pacific settlement of international disputes.

Facilitators

Britain and America were born from the same mother. Despite a century and a quarter of disputes, there still remained much that was similar between them. Once political elites and diplomats came on board, they had many similarities to propel their arguments for comity into mainstream acceptance. This is why the US-British relationship moved so rapidly from dispute to comity in just a matter of years. As has been discussed already, the United States and Britain were alike in language, race, culture, social order, political order, ancestral heritage and had similar political structure and ideology. Further, the two had heterogeneous economic interests allowing business elites to form ties and promote greater ties from specializations in differing trades. From the military side, the British Admiralty drove rapprochement understanding their precarious situation while the US Navy understood the advantages of a powerful and benign ally.

It was the presence of these facilitators that made rapprochement and accommodation happen so quickly for Britain and the United States. These ties not only increased the rapidity but also the depth to which the friendship would reach. When Churchill finally abdicated the responsibilities of hegemony to the United States in 1946, his speech was less a speech between two nations than a domestic policy speech in which he spoke of mutual responsibility and a common citizenship.

Anglo-Japanese Accommodation

The accommodation between the United States and Great Britain serves as an example of peaceful transition between hegemons despite not being the primary goal. Peaceful accommodation was achieved due to inducements, allowing both sides to enter into a trust relationship. Once the trusting relationship was established a great deal of facilitators took the relationship from mutual cooperation to rapprochement to a firm security community and very nearly to union.⁶

The analysis of Japan and Great Britain will show that absent any real facilitators, accommodation required deliberate and calculated measures and the relationship never surpassed the cooperation level. Thus the US-UK accommodation represents a best-case scenario while the UK-Japan accommodation represents a weakest-case scenario. This spans the continuum of possibilities, while both scenarios are also highly homogenous to a US-China scenario.

Inducements

The same security community that existed for Britain in the American accommodation also existed for the Anglo-Japanese accommodation. Great Britain faced a range of imperial commitments with increasing security dilemmas from every quarter. Like the United States, Japan was another naval competitor, but only in the Pacific. Japan won a victory against China in 1895 and continued to expand and improve its naval fleet. Worried about the inadequacy of its fleet to protect all of its interests, Britain sought both to keep Japan from threatening its power and to decrease its commitments in the Pacific. Further exacerbating the issue was French and Russian interests in

⁶ Kupchan, *How Enemies*, 16.

Northeast Asia. Combined, Russia and France had seven first-class battleships, two second-class battleships and twenty cruisers in the Pacific.⁷ By accommodating Japan's rise Britain determined it could keep rivalry with Japan at bay, meet its naval obligations in the Pacific and check Franco-Russian expansionist trends.

In this environment, Japan similarly felt threatened by the Franco-Russian alliance and their movements toward Japanese interests. After consolidating its victory over China, Japan sought to expand its influence in Korea, Manchuria and China. The trans-Siberian railway created substantial security concerns for these Japanese interests. After much deliberation, including probing Russia about a mutual alliance, Japan decided to take the outstretched hand of Great Britain in 1902. This allowed the two powers, combined in strength, to have the preponderance of battleships and cruisers in the region.

Reciprocation

Japan and Great Britain largely had differing objectives and interests prior to alliance. So, while negotiations took longer than a year, an act of unilateral appeasement was never required. However, British noninterference in the Sino-Japanese war and Japanese assistance in the Boxer Rebellion signaled benign intentions from both parties. This laid the foundation for both to reciprocate in a bi-lateral agreement and alliance.

Following the alliance, the extent of their trust would soon be tested. The alliance agreed upon by Britain and Japan was only triggered if either party was at war with two or more powers. This agreement allowed Japan to go to war with Russia with the reasonable expectation that France would not enter the conflict without risking war with Britain. Britain took cooperation one step further: to show its

⁷ Kupchan, *How Enemies*, 136.

intent to Japan, it bought two Chilean battleships to keep them out of the hands of the Russians and also ensured France would not enter the contest by entering into a naval accord.⁸

In gratitude, Japan upgraded the alliance with Great Britain in 1905 to the terms the United Kingdom truly sought from the beginning. The scope of the new alliance included India and Korea and stipulated that if one nation found itself at war with any single nation that the other would come to its aid. Further, they elevated their diplomatic relations to include full embassies. The alliance worked so well that both parties extended the alliance for another ten years in 1911. This alliance brought Japan into World War I on the side of the British.

Communication and Clarity

Communication and clarity were spelled out in the treaty in a “promise to communicate frankly and fully with each other when any of the interests affected by [the] treaty [were] in jeopardy.”⁹ Later renewals maintained the “fully and frankly” terms, which worked admirably for those things which were agreed upon in the alliance. The establishment of embassies further enabled communication on critical issues about the alliance.

Yet outside the terms of the alliance an element of distrust remained. Lacking broader communication, both sides remained suspicious of one another. For example, a member of British Parliament at the time stated that “In making a treaty with the Japanese we were making a treaty with a people who were more or less an enigma to us.”¹⁰ Differing political structures allowed Japan easy understanding of British interests and intentions but Britain continually felt ill at ease. Vice-

⁸ Kupchan, *How Enemies*, 137.

⁹ "Primary Documents - Anglo-Japanese Alliance," *firstworldwar.com*, on-line, Internet, 30 January 1902, available from <http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/anglojapanesealliance1902.htm>

¹⁰ Kupchan, *How Enemies*, 141.

admiral Bridge expressed the sentiment that the Japanese retained ‘the innate suspiciousness of the Oriental’ and felt that they were watching the British “very closely.”¹¹

Further, each party saw the other as capitalizing on the alliance for its individual gain, rather than for mutual cooperation or mutual gains. The alliance never shifted from a few political elites to the broader communities and institutions. These suspicions never allowed broad reciprocation but only mutual cooperation in so far as specific mutually agreeable objectives were identified.

Mechanisms for Dispute Resolution

Where the US-British accommodation pivoted on strategic and broad understandings and cooperation; the Anglo-Japanese accommodation centered on structured alliances and diplomatic resolutions. The dispute resolution mechanisms of arbitration utilized in the US-British case required a level of mutual trust that did not exist between London and Tokyo.

Fortunately the heterogeneity in interests between the two was partially why the accommodation was forged. Beyond narrow security interests, Japan and Britain had very few conflicting interests. Those that did exist were diplomatically discussed and ultimately resolved in order to maintain the formal alliance.

Facilitators

The Anglo-Japanese accommodation never went beyond cooperation because many facilitators were largely absent. Negotiations between the allies were always handled secretively by elites.¹² In Britain, the government muted the alliance in fear of domestic backlash. Racial

¹¹ Kupchan, *How Enemies*, 141.

¹² Ayako Hotta-Lister, "The Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1911," *Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines*, on-line, Internet, April 2002, available from <http://sticerd.lse.ac.uk/dps/is/IS432.pdf>

attitudes played a significant role in dampening popular support and increased interaction. While it is true that neither side had vital interests at stake, the two nations were heterogeneous in culture, race, language, social structures, and political order. Economic suspicion and structures made both sides unwilling to broaden their alliance.

Both sides realized that in order for the alliance to be sustainable and beneficial, it needed to reach a grass roots level. The British put forward literature accessible to the country's elites and finally in 1910 decided to hold a Japanese-British Exhibition. One of the main ambitions of the exhibition was to educate the public about Japanese culture and its importance in the international arena. It also sought to allay fears of the "yellow peril" and decrease racial tensions.

In the end, the lack of facilitators dampened the process and incompatibilities in facilitators actually detracted from the alliance. Due to Tokyo's political structure, London never quite felt comfortable with Japan. Kupchan asserts that "the uncertainty stemming from Britain's inability to discern Japanese motives prevent them from letting down their guard, limiting the nature and scope of strategic restraint.

Japan, in turn, sensed British distrust of its motives, ensuring that the security dilemma, even if moderated, continued to operate."¹³ Further, racial attitudes contributed to the aura of suspicion. A foreign office memo from 1921 speaks to the patronizing attitude and racial attitudes present at the time stating "in every respect, except the racial one, Japan stands on a par with the great governing nations of the world. But however powerful Japan may eventually become, the white races will never be able to admit her equality."¹⁴ "Yellow peril" attitudes triggered

¹³ Kupchan, *How Enemies*, 152.

¹⁴ Kupchan, *How Enemies*, 155.

anti-white sentiment in Japan and the alliance only increased these attitudes.¹⁵

Japanese trade in China made British businessmen wary and the profound sense of differences only heightened during the two decades of partnership. These differences were manageable but deprived the two powers of advancing accommodation to a stable security cooperation or union. It forced the two to manage accommodation through conscious and deliberate measures. The two were so different and the internal political dynamics so great that negative pressures kept the two at arm's length while trying to embrace. This forced both sides to maintain and deliberately forge the relationship rather than being in the formidable position of allowing positive momentum to take over.

These two case studies inform the case of Sino-American accommodation in several ways. First, China is a rising power with significant potential, similar to the rising United States of the late 1800s. China has not yet eclipsed American power but the relative power positions of Great Britain and the United States and the United States and China are very similar. Similarly, but not as pronounced, overextension of the hegemon's power existed back then as it does today in the United States. Second, similar points of tension due to territorial and hemispherical disputes exist today between China and the United States as existed in the late 1800s between the United States and Britain. Third, a paucity of facilitators and some detractors exist in the Sino-American accommodation, similar to the Anglo-Japanese accommodation. Fortunately in accommodation's favor, China and America are tied much tighter economically and structurally. Still, there exist significant detractors that will make the Sino-American relationship more forced than natural. These will be discussed in the next chapter where US accommodation of a rising China is analyzed in greater detail.

¹⁵ Kupchan, *How Enemies*, 156.

Chapter 5

Applying Accommodation Theory

Those who would trade our freedom for the soup kitchen of the welfare state have told us that they have a utopian solution of peace without victory. They call their policy "accommodation." And they say if we only avoid any direct confrontation with the enemy, he will forget his evil ways and learn to love us . . . We cannot buy our security, our freedom from the threat of the bomb by committing an immorality so great as saying to a billion human beings now in slavery behind the Iron Curtain, "Give up your dreams of freedom because to save our own skin, we are willing to make a deal with your slave-masters." . . every lesson of history tells us that the greater risk lies in appeasement, and this is the specter our well-meaning liberal friends refuse to face—that their policy of accommodation is appeasement and it gives no choice between peace and war, only between fight or surrender.

Ronald Reagan, "A Time for Choosing," 27 October 1964

US policies regarding China are incongruent with each other, as noted earlier. The United States currently seeks further engagement while simultaneously trying to contain China. Containment and the use of military signaling may engender short-term acquiescence but long-term insecurity and eventually, as China increases power, may trigger an arms race or worse. Engagement is increasing interaction, but as noted above, increased interaction may prove helpful or harmful—under the auspices of containment, it is harmful. These duplicitous policies, known as "congagement," are moving the two nations closer to war and can never cement the trust required for peaceful resolution, responsible action or accommodation. Accommodation via a foreign policy of cooperation and reciprocate behavior is the only policy that offers a

peaceful solution. This chapter determines that accommodation is possible although very difficult given the history, lack of inducements, current climate and heterogeneity of the two countries. In order to explore the subject, this chapter reviews the history, identifies the main obstacles, details the benefits and offers some paths that might make both Chinese and US accommodation possible.

Historical and Current Obstacles to Chinese Accommodation

Built on the back of enmity toward the Soviets, accommodation began between China and the United States with “ping pong diplomacy” and Henry Kissinger and President Nixon’s “secret” visit to Beijing in 1971.¹ During this time, President Nixon gave an enormous unilateral concession to China by acknowledging the PRC position on Taiwan. This policy shift became the first accommodative act of many as it set aside this strategic and seemingly intractable issue in favor of increased engagement and rapprochement. Embassies were established and many agreements made.

Unfortunately, this spirit of comity did not last long. The United States began backing away from accommodation and the policy of “one China” as early as 1979.² Arms sales and increasing support to Taiwan made the PRC suspicious of US intentions.³ The crackdown in Tian’anmen Square erased much of the positive progress in the Sino-American rapprochement as the US domestic audience convulsed at the repression of Chinese citizens. Ultimately, the demise of the Soviet Union erased a large part of the inducements for both countries to continue cooperation beyond economic interests.

“Congagement” has been the US policy choice with China since 1989, yet it is now trending more toward confrontation. China has made

¹ Henry Kissinger, *On China*, (New York: The Penguin Press, 2011), 232.

² Kissinger, 381.

³ Kissinger, 382.

militant moves toward Taiwan, allowed North Korea to obtain nuclear weapons, induced the United States to attack its embassy in Belgrade and collided one of its jet fighters with a US reconnaissance aircraft. Further, the United States continues to sell arms to Taiwan and maintains cordial relations with the Dalai Lama.

Even in economics, where the two countries have the most to gain from each other, significant rifts still appear. While the United States has engaged China more fully within the society of nations by assisting its acceptance into the World Trade Organization, the People's Republic of China continues to manipulate its currency, ignore intellectual property rights, business norms and customs and undermine US businesses. This turns US elites against China. Although the United States continues to engage economically with China, it is focusing more often on the negatives in the relationship and in dialogue than the positives.

Tensions have begun to move from the economic and political sphere to the cyber and military domains. China has increased its spying, stealing and destruction in the cyber realm. The United States counters this threat by reacting both defensively and offensively. China has also produced and proven its anti-satellite capabilities, anti-access capabilities and increased its militant rhetoric. With the US military pivoting its focus toward the Pacific, China feels threatened. This may be why China is collaborating with Russia in pursuit of greater security.

Whether China is reacting to US security provocations, or the US is reacting to China's military buildup is difficult to prove; what matters is that China's military buildup appears inconsistent with its stated goal of a peaceful rise and creates security dilemmas for its neighbors and US allies.⁴ China's support of rogue regimes and mercantilist policies

⁴ Shalendra D. Sharma, *China and India in the Age of Globalization*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 221.

creates international problems, provoking nations to bandwagon against the rising giant in fear that it may not become a responsible world leader.

A great many inducements are actually pulling the United States in the opposite direction of accommodating China. These include democratic values and partners, domestic politics and unions, and international interests. With economic issues center stage and jobs important to every election cycle, unions and workers alike do not want increased relations with China as their current practices undermine American jobs. At this point, and as the stronger power, the United States lacks sufficient inducements to seek a peaceful accommodation policy with the Chinese, particularly if it must make greater conciliations than it receives in return.

Further, a spirit of American exceptionalism has taken root in many powerful corners of the United States which produces a culture that believes it cannot (nor should it) be beaten.⁵ Similar to Ronald Reagan's quote at the beginning of this chapter, therefore, peaceful accommodation is seen as not only surrender but immoral.⁶ The United States possesses supremacy in political, economic, and military power. This fact alone gives the United States little impetus to pursue Chinese accommodation.

President Obama entered office striving to abandon the policy of containment of the PRC; his desire was instead to instigate a policy of accommodation.⁷ However, a mixture of the domestic and external factors discussed above, has pushed him down a trajectory that may lead toward conflict. American culture makes it ready to fight for its values and fear drives it to increased security measures. The founder of

⁵ Colin S. Gray, *Explorations in Strategy*, (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1998), 89.

⁶ Ronald Reagan, "A Time for Choosing" on-line, Internet, 27 October 1964, available from <http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/reference/timechoosing.html> (Reagan 1964)

⁷ Emily O. Goldman, *Power in Uncertain Times: Strategy in the Fog of Peace*, (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2011), 158

STRATFOR and renowned political scientist George Friedman asserts that US strategy is in its DNA (i.e. embedded culture, history and beliefs drive its strategy). US DNA produces a mixture of overconfidence and fear with a belief that its culture and values are self-evidently the best. This fear continually pushes the United States to disrupt rising powers and orders that may challenge its values and power.⁸

Worse, the United States is a society with an ever-decreasing tolerance and patience for future investments with distant payoffs. Gray shows that the emerging culture, that lacks foresight, is becoming heavily engrained and institutionalized. Therefore an argument to deal with a problem whose result will emerge ten or possibly twenty years from now, (although very timely to shape the future) renders the idea very challenging for today's US political leaders.⁹ Unsurprisingly then, President Obama's policies have increasingly focused on containment while he pushes for further engagement, hoping to change China's values.

External factors for the United States are also exacerbating an already difficult atmosphere for accommodation. Long-time US allies in the Pacific, suspicious of Chinese intentions, seek US assurances of protection. Extended deterrence is very fragile—allies will continue to request greater assurances and actions the more powerful the Chinese become.¹⁰ Further, as old enemies of China seek to balance its ambitions and power by increasing military and security ties with the United States, China senses the United States is slowly encircling it. This is causing security concerns for China and creating a security spiral that could likely lead to future violence.

⁸ George Friedman, *The Next 100 Years: A Forecast for the 21st Century*. (New York: Doubleday, 2009), 15-30.

⁹ Gray, 91.

¹⁰ Timothy W. Crawford, "The Endurance of Extended Deterrence," in *Complex Deterrence: Strategy in the Global Age*, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2009), 277-298.

Internal issues within the PRC have made accommodation increasingly unpalatable. Lacking the prestige of the old guard and with a larger and better-informed middle class, the new CCP has deliberately increased Chinese nationalism to shore up its waning legitimacy.¹¹ Internal public opinion, correspondingly, pressures the CCP into tougher stances on issues involving Japan, Taiwan, the United States and others.¹² Further, as internal issues flare up and proliferate, the government reacts by taking hardline stances in the international arena to increase its legitimacy and national loyalty at home.¹³ These internal and external policies and reactions inevitably create further security dilemmas, heightening the security spiral. Even if China truly is committed to a peaceful rise, domestic discords may be pushing it toward more revisionist tendencies.

An increasing security dilemma possibly leading to war is not an unavoidable future, however. Human beings have consciously made choices to interrupt the natural flow of the future. If it is possible for humans to bend things in their favor and if nothing is predetermined, then peace is possible. Another Cold War and/or armed conflict with China are both unconscionable options. The United States is normatively unable to take greater resources by conquest. It is also unable to make and hold technological advantages for long-term economic supremacy. Therefore, the only responsible decision, albeit very difficult given the above obstacles and history, is accommodation.

A Future for US-Sino Accommodation

Despite the grim picture painted above, support does exist for future Sino-US cooperation. Hostilities have not yet manifested themselves between the two countries and open and clear

¹¹ Shirk, 62-4

¹² Shirk.

¹³ Sharma, 243.

communication precedents already exist. While some vital interests overlap, many of America's interests in the Pacific and Far East are more interests tied to its allies.¹⁴ Further, the two countries already have some established methods for dealing with conflict, such as the six party talks and high-level diplomatic visits. These could all act in accommodation's favor.

To overcome the difficult obstacles outlined above, both nations must start to create an atmosphere that will increase the acceptability of accommodation and decrease the tendency toward polarization. One means of doing so is by implementing greater policies of cooperation and reciprocation between the United State and China. Yet lacking almost all of the facilitators discussed in chapter 3, this will take a great deal of time, particularly in the current hostile atmosphere.

Fertile ground exists in America for accommodation; polls indicate that Americans are amenable to a rising China and could be made more so. A CBS poll found that 59% of Americans thought China was either a friend or an ally of the United States.¹⁵ Another poll, in 2010, showed that a majority of Americans believed that the 21st century would be more of a Chinese century than an American century.

In order to bolster greater domestic support for accommodation, both countries need to cooperate more. Internal dialogue in the United States must shift its focus to the positive aspects of China's rise, just as Great Britain did in the late 1800s and early 1900s concerning the United States. To help foster this, China's negative anti-American and anti-Japanese propaganda and negative nationalism need to change.¹⁶ The two nations need to create a broader reaching G2-like body to find

¹⁴ Sharma, 242.

¹⁵ Various Corporate Authors, "China," *PollingReport.com*, on-line, Internet, 6-10 November 2011 available from <http://www.pollingreport.com/china.htm> This was down, however, from 2008 when 67% felt this way.

¹⁶ Shirk, 258.

areas of compatibility. China and the United States need to help elites and domestic audiences understand the mutual benefits of peaceful coexistence.

Concrete international actions must swiftly follow, proving greater cooperation can be beneficial on a global scale. China needs to increase its compliance with international financial norms and laws. The United States can then reciprocate by sharing technology to increase its capabilities and, as it did in 1969, relax restrictions and further open bilateral cooperation. Military industrial complexes need enticements to perceive peace as more beneficial than the short term gains of the alternative.¹⁷ Increasing military cooperation and the lifting of strict post-Tiananmen arms sanctions are examples of how to accomplish this.

These are not simple proposals or changes. This will require politicians to find avenues on which to justify large shifts. Several avenues are available and more will appear over time to help create this atmosphere and make these changes. Politicians understand that timing has a great deal to do with success and change. George W. Bush, given the power and legitimacy to make large changes due to the terrorist attacks of 9/11, for example, used the so-called War on Terrorism as an avenue for powerful changes he felt fitting. While other avenues will appear, the immediate and most effective opportunity today, and the one explored herein, is the current economic crisis.

Economic anxiety has appeared over the last several years in the United States and is beginning in China. World economics is a powerful motivator and a sufficiently plausible base to use as a stage from which to legitimize improved relations. The economy is center stage for Americans now. In a recent Gallup poll 70% of Americans understood

¹⁷ Arms sales to China are one avenue to increase incentives.

that what happens in China is vitally important to the United States.¹⁸ In a Pew Research poll, 58% believed it was very important for the United States to build stronger relations with China and that economic interests top the list of concerns.¹⁹ For the Chinese, the economy must continue to thrive for the regime to maintain legitimacy. Both Chinese and American elites understand the importance of the economy, which gives leaders in both nations the needed power and latitude, to attempt to change the contextual environment.

As the contextual environment shifts, the next step may be a Nixon-style act of cooperation after modest preparation of the domestic audience; this may require a slow start at first to achieve acceptance and establish the precedence for greater acts. Which route the American politicians take, in coordination with Chinese counterparts, depends on the politicians themselves, their legitimacy at the time, their confidence, and the extent to which both sides have shifted their domestic and international contexts.

If politicians believe a slower start is the best path (citing the economy), US politicians could seize the opportunity to reduce military bases overseas in this period of fiscal constraint. For its part, China could reciprocate (or lead) by leaning toward the West with regard to Iran, citing instability-causing problems in the financial markets. The financial veil could allow for joint operations in the South China Sea, decreases in arms buildup around Taiwan and less exercises involving Taiwan.

Citing stability in South Korean financial markets, China could offer compromises over North Korea to build trust and a warmer spirit

¹⁸ Frank Newport, "China Tops List of Countries Vitally Important to US; Egypt 9th," *Gallup.com*, on-line, Internet, 9 February 2011, available from <http://www.gallup.com/poll/146039/china-tops-list-countries-vitally-important-egypt-9th.aspx?ref=more>

¹⁹ Various Corporate Authors, "China," *PollingReport.com*, on-line, Internet, 6-10 November 2011 available from <http://www.pollingreport.com/china.htm>

between the two countries. Environmental concerns are another area where mutual acts of appeasement and reciprocation could foster greater trust in the name of economics. The point here is not to be overly prescriptive but to offer a few instances of the many avenues that exist to begin accommodation veiled in economic terms. The idea is to prepare both domestic and international audiences for greater cooperation between the United States and China, whether citing economic necessity or some crisis *du jour*. These lesser acts can help each side determine any reciprocations and levels of cooperation necessary to divine intent, gain trust and give politicians sufficient evidence for expanding concessions in the future.

The next step is one of the most crucial and risky: offering larger unilateral cooperation or significant tests of benign intent and reciprocation, with clear and cogent communications. These tests are the most risky because large acts of cooperation carry implications in the complex realm of international relations. If done too quickly or in the wrong context, cooperative behavior may appear as weakness to both domestic and external audiences. Further, cooperation means giving away something that is valuable; once granted, the possession may require the use of force to recover it.

Cooperation and reciprocation also carry with them international implications. As rapprochement with China in the 1970s changed the political calculus, so will cooperation change the strategic calculus of countries such as Russia, Japan, India, Iran, Vietnam and Korea. This step, while being the most risky, is also the most crucial. These acts generate sufficient trust to eliminate further points of conflict. With the two sides passing each other's tests, they can then create and institute more formal communications and mechanisms of dispute resolution. Further narratives can increase incentives, allowing the process to take on a life of its own.

In the case of Sino-US accommodation, several avenues exist for large acts of cooperation. Cession of Taiwan to China may be the most significant and effective proof of US benign intent and act as an inducement for reciprocation. This act has historic precedent; Nixon's similar act of acknowledging China's position on Taiwan worked very well toward creating an atmosphere for rapprochement in the 1970s. When Nixon did this, China acted responsibly and reciprocated by opening its markets to the United States. This act unlocked a spring of bilateral agreements, programs and institutions. While this is an enormous concession, the United States truly is not losing anything that it has not already lost or may eventually lose anyway. It is better to give it away while the United States is still powerful enough to offer it as a real gift and can do so under its terms. The United States may lose some prestige now (while possibly gaining peace and the moral high ground) but this is better than losing it forcibly and suffering deeper and more severe losses of prestige and diplomatic standing later.²⁰

Investing China with increased responsibility for the sea lines of communication (SLOC) in its region may also be a real test, and one less public, of its intentions to reciprocate and demonstrate the responsibility that comes with growing power. This offers China the opportunity to demonstrate strategic restraint, especially where vital interests are at stake for so many. Again, depending on the context, both sides may need to veil these changes in economic realities. If previous efforts resulted in success, politicians could also draw on these examples for greater support of these policies. These two actions give China what it claims it wants, a path to regional hegemony, and more than proves friendly intent from the United States.

²⁰ Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics*, (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 194.

For China, cooperation over US agendas in Iran and North Korea could go far to reciprocate American accommodation over Taiwan and/or the SLOCs. One of China's chief motivations for allying with regimes the West considers rogue is their support for China's Taiwan policy. Ceding some large issues over Iran and North Korea to the West would show the United States it is reciprocating. Further, these are concessions that are easier to sell for China in the name of nuclear peace and can bring their country international prestige. These concessions help China determine US intentions in both the Middle East and leave the United States less impetus for military activity in its neighborhood.

Cooperation on US desires for greater human rights in Tibet or offering extended access to rare earth elements would be other large concessions made specifically to foster trust and a firm relationship for greater accommodation. Again, the idea here is not to be overly prescriptive but to give examples of areas where accommodation can gain a solid foothold.

Once a spirit of cooperation, reciprocation and benign intent takes hold, then success can breed success. Both sides must be able to claim victory and show that even greater accommodation is possible. By formalizing broader institutions of communication and dispute resolution, accommodation continues moving through every other possible touch point of conflict. As discussed in Chapter 4, depending on the context and level of comity, this could be as simple as dispute resolution through low-level diplomats (such as happened with the Anglo-US accommodation), or be more formal as in the Sino-British case.

In the 1970s, under much different circumstances, a decade of cooperation yielded very shallow, albeit broad results. Unfortunately, due to the heterogeneity of the two countries, the peace was very unstable and many important results unraveled quickly due to minor mistakes. While political leaders must realize that success often breeds further success, strategic contexts will shift with each cooperative effort,

creating unexpected and often heavy pressures. Certainly, relations with Japan, Vietnam and South Korea will change for both sides and many other unintended consequences will occur. However, politicians must focus on the greater good and maintain positive narratives while fostering incentives internally and externally to “stay the course.”

Benefits of US-Sino Accommodation

The long-term benefits are many; chief amongst these is the possibility of avoiding future security spirals, cold wars or even world war. Both China and the United States could gain greatly from a strategic bilateral partnership, allowing both a greater voice in the revision of world order. Further, taking pressure off Beijing allows moderate elites a larger voice. This could lead to greater pluralism and reform in China, less nationalistic tendencies and help China responsibly pick up greater obligations in the international arena. All of this could spell great prosperity and long-term peace for the world. It could also mean that the two most powerful nations balance one another and create stability through greater ties.

In contrast, if war is the only way to prevent China's rise in power, tests from initial acts of accommodation could quickly decipher Chinese intent before China becomes too powerful to stop. As appeasement made clear Hitler's intentions, so may initial acts of cooperation help others divine China's intentions. Beginning accommodation now could provide a crucial and true test of Chinese benign intent; the outcome of that test would then offer a powerful voice to the United States in determining its rise or fall. Accommodation now leaves the United States sufficient power to counter a rising China, rather than exhaust it in containment strategies protecting minor states that can easily fall to a more powerful and patient China. Further, in both the long run and the short term, accommodation allows the United States to take the moral high

ground.²¹ This could aid the United States both internally and internationally, undermine internal Chinese strategies, and help lead the Chinese domestic populace to accept values that are more Western.

Additionally, a policy of accommodation will place the United States in a position from which it can morally divest itself of some of its obligations in the Pacific and allow it the ability to reset relations there, in order to employ other, more sustainable strategies, such as offshore balancing, “friendly conquests”²² and deceptive strategies. US divestiture of selected responsibilities in the Pacific will force allies to take a larger interest in their own security rather than relying on the United States. This would also remind the world not to take the stabilizing force the United States provides for granted.

Accommodation further allows Americans to be true to US values. Americans believe they can act to change history. This engrained belief leads Americans to believe they can overcome any problem.²³ Americans believe solutions exist to seemingly intractable problems; however, they do not believe these solutions ought to be achieved through tyranny or war. In solving China’s rise, Americans should not allow “the unending race to keep up with foreign military and economic competition [threaten] to erode the very values that make [American] society worth defending in the first place.”²⁴ The United States must not become what the Pulitzer Prize winner Walter McDougall described as a “Big Brother, so complete as to control the nations of the earth and the thoughts and activities of

²¹ A.F.K. Organski, *World Politics*, (New York, N.Y.: Random House, 1969), 374.

²² The Jesuits utilized friendly conquest as did the Jews in the UK and the United States to gain Israel. Alternatively, Libicki (Libicki 2007) shows how cordial relationships between countries can foster relationships in which another country becomes dependent on the other country and its systems. At some point the dependency and vulnerability grow so large that military power no longer becomes an option.

²³ Walter A. McDougall, . . . *The Heavens and the Earth: a Political History of the Space Age*, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), 71.

²⁴ McDougall, 13.

its subjects [sufficiently] to choke off the sources of . . . change.”²⁵ The United States should not lose its values by controlling every nation or stopping every rise. Accommodation is the path that shows how politicians should “foster change and achieve a peace that secures one’s basic values.”²⁶ It not only allows Americans to maintain their values but to display those values on an international level.

Finally, accommodation allows Americans to be true to their values *and* their interests. A strong and responsible China can usher in a century of unequalled prosperity between nations with US GDP per capita increasing significantly. Even if China exceeds US power eventually, Americans will still prosper and maintain an international position sufficient to influence world events. Eventually the United States can enact policies that enable it to overtake China again while setting the precedent for peaceful power transitions. The United States must make this decision consciously and while it is still strong enough to counter the Chinese, should they prove unwilling to reciprocate or irresponsible with their new regional power.

²⁵ McDougall, 13.

²⁶ Gilpin, 209.

Chapter 6

Conclusion: A Time for Choosing

China's tremendous rise in power requires management, unusual foresight and action. Hegemonic stability theory and history portend an inevitable war between the relatively declining United States and a rising China. Avoiding a future world war with a powerful China as well as a possibly dangerous security spiral must take priority. As this paper has shown, accommodating China's rise—how to accept, accommodate and successfully assist with China's rise—is a plausible alternative that may avoid future war. No academic literature explains how to do this successfully; yet by developing accommodation theory and applying it to China, this paper determines that it is possible for the United States to “make room” on the international stage without resorting to arms races or war. Still, there are many obstacles to overcome and its maintenance will require deliberate and conscious measures.

China's rise is the natural result of globalization as its wealth reaches commensurate status with its resources.¹ Advances in industrialization have arguably led to increased GDP; this growth could easily remain in the double digits for the next decade. The United States on the other hand has likely reached the peak of industrialization; it is only making gains through technology and increased efficiencies. Globalization is creating equal opportunities for people and nations. As China obtains the technology, its greater resources will bring it to surge in wealth beyond the United States. With greater power come higher and greater expectations. If China can navigate the changes and problems

¹ Barry Naughton, *The Chinese Economy: Transition and Growth*, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2007), 398.

increasing prosperity often create, it will seek changes to the international system and its privileges therein.

This paper has shown that both hegemonic stability theory and history suggest a rising China and a (relatively) declining United States could result in the next world war. Current US policy on China suggests the probability of this outcome. To keep this from happening, the United States has three options. It can increase its resources through measures such as taking territory and people, it can confront China now and keep it from rising or it can accommodate China's rise and welcome its arrival as a superpower. None of these options are easy but a choice must be made so decisions avoided now do not hold the strategic future hostage. Assuming normative standards of international behavior, confrontation and taking resources are untenable options. Accommodating China's rise has two benefits: it allows for the chance of peace, in accordance with US values, and it gives the United States the moral high ground and impetus to confront China if it fails to respond responsibly.

There are many instances where accommodation has worked (and failed) in the history of international relations. The accommodation that occurred between Great Britain and the United States is unique in two ways; it is the only case where transfer of hegemony happened peacefully and it is the very best case scenario for accommodation. A less stable case of accommodation occurred between Great Britain and Japan due to the heterogeneity of the two nations. This accommodation was unstable but succeeded due to far-sighted politicians keeping it alive. It, however, ended due to changing contexts for politicians in both countries. Other cases of accommodation inform accommodation theory as well. The case of Sino-Soviet accommodation illustrates an ideological accommodation and the case of Argentina and Brazil illustrates the importance of internal politics to accommodation.

These instances of accommodation and the accumulation of academic literature suggest that successful accommodation requires

inducements, reciprocity, communication and clarity, as well as mechanisms for dispute resolution. These must exist to begin the process and they must remain for accommodation to continue. Facilitators can increase the level of cooperation between the partnering nations but are not required for its success. In the case of Britain and Japan, where facilitators were absent, continual accommodation required conscious and deliberate efforts for its upkeep. Where facilitators abound, as in the American-British case, accommodation will more likely succeed in creating a stable peace and friendship.

The most appropriate model cases for future US accommodation of China are the British-American accommodation and British-Japanese accommodation. China is like the United States of the late 1800s rising to compete with the world's hegemon. The case of British-American transfer of hegemony is the best for analyzing this situation. However, the heterogeneity of the two nations makes the Japanese-British accommodation a more likely scenario. These two cases offer the greatest insights as well as cover the span between best and worst case scenarios.

Modeling the United States' accommodation of China on these two scenarios, one glaringly obvious problem is that of inducements. The United States has very little to induce itself to accommodate China. The United States is comfortable as the world's hegemon and possesses considerably more power. With so few inducements, history suggests that it will not realize the extent of its decline until it is too late to accommodate China. Tellingly, attempting accommodation with so few inducements is unprecedented in history. Therefore, the absence of inducements is what makes a US-Sino accommodation so difficult and unlikely unless leaders heed the warnings of this research. Communication and dispute mechanisms exist between the two countries but are still insufficient for full accommodation. These will become sufficient once the process of accommodation begins, however.

Further, lack of facilitators and a high degree of heterogeneity further exacerbate the problem.

Given the uncertainty of China's internal politics and its continued rise, the United States could remain in a "wait and see" mode as it continues its policy of "conengagement." Economic inducements will keep the United States engaged economically while incentives for further containment and confrontation from known entities and allies could produce more confrontation. The absence of positive facilitators and existence of negative factors could further drive US policy increasingly toward confrontation rather than rapprochement and accommodation.

For example, the difficulties and complexities of the relations between Japan, the United States and China could create major difficulties for US accommodation of China. The words of Robert Gilpin seem prescient as he stated that "in the absence of shared values and interests, the mechanism of peaceful change has little chance of success . . . there is little evidence to suggest that the values and interest that unite the human race have displaced those that divide it into a world of competing groups and sovereign states."² Inducements for action, like those found in the historical cases, will not come until much further down a road of confrontation from which there may not be an option of detour. Yet maintaining the current policy on China is ill advised; the United States and China must engage in accommodation to avoid future conflict.

Accommodation is simple academically but is the road less traveled and certainly the more difficult in practice. It requires the cooperation and will of both parties and the likely loss of important interests at the risk of losing even more in the hope of future cooperation and reciprocation. Accommodation requires higher levels of trust,

² Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics*, (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 209.

patience, understanding, forgiveness and concern and can change the strategic context in which a nation operates. Accommodating China risks US allies in the Pacific, democratic ideological leadership and some level of prestige. Opponents, sensing weakness, may press the advantage, possibly weakening the US position to act. The risks are real, the actions are difficult and the implementation is harrowing but the potential payoff is enormous.

If accommodation succeeds and peaceful coexistence results between China and the United States, it could end a barbarous human history of hegemonic war and possibly avert a dangerous security spiral or major world war. It offers the possibility of a more peaceful and prosperous time in human history. Further, and as discussed previously, where the United States may forfeit some advantages of economic hegemony, other advantages will appear.

This strategy, perhaps, requires temporary “tactical defeat” (loss of hegemony, at least economically) but if followed by prudent policy, could be the harbinger of a more powerful re-emergence. It will be difficult, but it will also be worth it. Further, if for some reason accommodation fails, the United States and its allies will be able to operate from the moral high ground, giving them the ability to control the mental and psychological contest before the physical fight begins and giving them a mandate from which to gather other powers to their aid, all while remaining true to Western values.³

Lacking inducements, accommodation will require unusual levels of statesmanship. It will require changing rhetoric and reversing antagonistic relationships within the domestic and international contexts. It requires laying a foundation and managing the accommodation to reduce the possibility of accommodation’s failure from

³ Peter Ackerman and Jack Duvall, *A Force More Powerful*, (New York: Palgrave, 2000).

lack of continued inducements for prolonged success. This will require serious and concentrated effort. It will require statesmen with uncanny conviction as domestic and external pressures will mount with each step.

Depending on the situation, many small acts of cooperation and reciprocation may start the process. These will likely be required to build trust, show progress and offer concrete incentives for further cooperation. Success often breeds further success but, in a complex international environment, strategic calculations will change with every cooperative act. This will require foresight, imagination, management and courage to continue accommodation to the point it becomes sustainable long-term.

Now is the time to consider a peaceful transition from the current US policy of “conengagement” with China to accommodation. It must happen while the United States has significant capacities; otherwise, security fears and perceptions of weakness will prevent statesmen from creating the atmosphere required for accommodation. Further, these significant capacities not only give China powerful impetus to fulfill and pass the tests of benign intent, they also allow a large margin of error from which to recover if accommodation fails.⁴ The margin of error the United States currently enjoys decreases every day of China’s continued relative rise. The United States cannot count on its allies should China rise above US power over time. Power brings with it allies and changes the cost/benefit calculus for each nation. A new world with China as a peer competitor is a significant unknown and current alignments will be tested, contested, and reconsidered. Seeking accommodation while still in an overwhelming position of power increases the United States’ ability to manage the instability and complexity that will ensue from changing the status quo. Complicated by international relations and lacking most

⁴ George Friedman, *The Next 100 Years: A Forecast for the 21st Century*. (New York: Doubleday, 2009), 47.

facilitators, this accommodation will take a great deal of time and will require significant advantage if the United States wants accommodation to succeed. The United States cannot wait until it has incontrovertible evidence that China's rise is inexorable.

Confrontation and containment are increasing the negative pressures of prestige and pride leading to violence. The Chinese have made it clear that they will not implement changes due to external pressure and that external pressure forces them to run counter to US aims.⁵ Engagement is increasing China's wealth and power and the continual increase in the cost and price of containment could exhaust US power as it strives to fulfill its global hegemonic role and confront a peer competitor at the same time. The United States should no longer ride the rudderless boat of strategic obfuscation and rest its strategy on hope for large internal changes within China. The self-defeating "strategy" of "congame" must end in favor of a clearer and more resolute policy concerning China. The United States and the world are at a strategic crossroads, which the passage of time will rob it of its opportunities.

The United States and its allies cannot keep China from rising without pretext. Increasing resources sufficient to challenge China is untenable. If the United States and the world want to change things before pressures constrain statesmen into strategic exhaustion and a negative course of action, now is the time for action. Similarly, if confrontation is inevitable, then now too is the time for action. Accommodation is *not* a choice between "fight or surrender" as Reagan stated; rather accommodation is the only means through which both nations can decide jointly and consciously between war and peace. Applying accommodation theory will determine which of these two paths

⁵ Henry Kissinger, *On China*, (New York: The Penguin Press, 2011), 468.

the future requires. Accommodation is the best course for both peace and clarification of the future path.



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